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Introduction 
 
“Those who use this hostel will have a special responsibility for interpreting to their friends 
in this country the feelings and aspirations of India. I am sure they will bring the best of India 
to us and we must hope that they will see and admire what is best in this country...India has 
learned her urge for freedom mainly from England. Her students have read our literature of 
freedom, have met our modern apostle of freedom and have broken the legend of the 
unchanging East.”1 
 
–Frederick Pethick-Lawrence, Secretary of State for India, September 1946 
 
 
 The subtext would have been hard to miss for those who watched as Britain’s final 
Secretary of State for India stood on the steps of the Indian Students’ Union and Hostel in 
downtown London and reminded his audience of the connections between India’s freedom 
and a British education. By the end of 1946, India’s independence was inevitable, with only a 
few details to be worked out. On one side of the negotiations had sat the British; on the other, 
a cadre of British-educated Indians. Mohandas Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Mohammed 
Ali Jinnah had all studied in Britain, whether as students at Oxford or Cambridge or in hopes 
of being called to the bar at the Inns of Court in London; the Indian National Congress was 
similarly full of Indians who had been educated in the heart of the British Empire. 
 Pethick-Lawrence’s speech was also one of conciliation, a remarkable note 
considering the tension that had long existed between Britain and the aspiring intellectuals of 
India. Less than half a century earlier, many Britons had been ready to ban Indian students 
from entering the country outright. Fearful of miscegenation, violence, and the gradual 
erosion of their empire, Britons had for decades regarded Indian students with suspicion. It 
hadn’t always been this way; until around 1910, the two groups had overcome sporadic 
tensions to coexist and interact as nominal equals in the imperial metropolis.  
                                                
1 OIOC IOR/L/I/142 file 17/20: “Indian Students’ Union and Hostel.” British Library, St. Pancras. 
Archival sources are hereafter cited using their reference numbers. 
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This thesis is the same story told three times, each with its own point of view and 
implications. The common strand is India House, a radical group of nationalist students 
based in suburban London who advocated anti-British violence and around whom swirled no 
shortage of popular intrigue and horror. One story is that of the students themselves, both 
within India House and without. For them, the group was a breath of fresh air from the 
restrictive intellectual climate of the Raj; though most of India House’s members stopped 
short of carrying out its militant plans, their ability to talk freely about issues of nationalism, 
Indian heritage, and freedom was itself a liberating experience.  
Another perspective is that of the British public. For the nameless faces in the hordes 
that filled London’s streets, India House was a sinister mystery just up the street. Though the 
outspoken radicals on the edge of town left many ordinary Britons unsettled by their presence 
and proximity, the unconscious contours of Britain’s liberal society prevented its citizens 
from punishing them in the absence of any crime. India House exposed uncomfortable truths 
about British society and the amorphous intersections of liberalism and empire in the minds 
of its normal people. 
 And finally, the third recurring voice in the history of India House is that of the 
British government, particularly its India Office. “Empires thrive on bureaucracy” began the 
foreword to Arnold P. Kaminsky’s The India Office, 1880-1910, a blunt reminder that for all 
the popular reimaginings of the British Empire as either a uniform and disciplined behemoth 
or a demi-mythological institution that transcended the very discourse of institutions, at its 
official core was little more than a group of decidedly mortal and indisputably fallible people 
doing the best they could with the resources they had.2 Even as generally well-organized and 
                                                
2 Robin B. Winks, “Foreword” from The India Office, 1880-1910, Arnold P. Kaminsky (New York: 
Greenwood, 1986),  xi. 
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tightly run as it may have been at its peak around the turn of the nineteenth century, the 
empire suffered from the same administrative issues that plague any complex institution, 
with effects as far-reaching as the Indian subcontinent but as close to home as Kensington 
and Cromwell Streets in central London.  
There has been a surge in recent historiography that questions who and what 
comprised the British Empire, the history of which superficially extends across every 
continent on the globe yet upon closer examination breaks down into an uncoordinated 
morass of businessmen, missionaries, and explorers all moving in different directions and 
with varying goals. It’s important to point out that the India Office – or any official agency at 
all, for that matter – is not a wholly accurate synonym for the British Empire. Historian John 
Darwin has gone to great lengths in the last decade to distance the empire as a whole from its 
administrators in the metropole: “[T]he conventional image of imperial rule, in which 
mustachioed titans in shorts impose their authority on resentful populations by sheer 
assertion of will is an agreeable (or disagreeable) fiction…[it] creates the illusion of a 
standardized apparatus of power whose command and control were centred in London.”3 
This may have been true for the empire at large, but for the purposes of this thesis, with its 
cast of characters and plot set squarely within the confines of Britain’s global metropolis, the 
mustachioed bureaucrats of Whitehall merit some deeper consideration.  
London was a fundamentally imperial city in the first decade of the twentieth century, 
and just as the British Empire seems to fall apart under too close of an examination, so too 
does London of a century ago strain under the constant tensions at play in a cosmopolitan 
metropolis. Though its independence was a distant dream decades away from realization, the 
                                                
3 John Darwin, Unfinished Empire: The Global Expansion of Britain (New York: Penguin, 2012), 189. 
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seeds of Indian nationalism had been sown early on and took root among some of the most 
politically inclined Indians studying at British universities around the turn of the nineteenth 
century, particularly those in the imperial capital. The transplanted students most willing to 
listen to the then-extreme ideas of nationalism and imperial resistance were also those most 
willing to carry out real acts of  aggression against the British government, and they coupled 
this ideological willingness for political violence with enough external financial backing to 
make it a reality.  
Despite the dangers posed by these radical Indian students – the group that captured 
the imaginations of the British public and that forms the basis of this work, if not the majority 
of their Indian colleagues in Britain – relatively little was done about them for years until 
19091, when a young Indian shot the Secretary of State’s political aide-de-camp at point 
blank range on the steps of the Imperial Institute in London. How this assassin was able to 
plan and carry out his attack was the immediate focus of the storm that followed, but the 
question of how he had become so radicalized in the first place required a much deeper look 
into the counter-terrorism measures in place in the imperial metropolis. This was the 
culminating moment of a unique strand in the larger narrative of British-Indian imperial 
relations: political resistance through violence was nothing out of the ordinary on the farthest 
reaches of British India, but for a group of displaced, free-floating foreigners to coagulate, 
ferment, and quite literally explode in the very heart of the empire was something different 
entirely. 
 As sophisticated and streamlined as Britain’s political intelligence agencies were able 
to conduct their surveillance and countermeasures against agitators in India, the parallels that 
existed at home could hardly be called comparable. The flash of Madan Lal Dhingra’s 
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revolver on July 1st, 1909, illuminated nearly a decade of dysfunction within Britain’s 
imperial bureaucracy, exposing both the typical symptoms of a bloated institution – 
insufficient communication, interdepartmental jealousy – and a profound misunderstanding 
of its imperial subjects. Though the latent dangers posed by these radicals were fairly well 
understood, Britain’s liberal attitudes towards its citizens – whether imperial subject or 
Briton by birth – at home provided a barrier just thick enough to effectively separate the 
governing from the governed; as the bureaucratic machinery in Whitehall clogged and 
slowed, the radicals were allowed to plan their acts of resistance unimpeded just miles north 
in suburban Highgate.  
This lack of action wasn’t due to any particular lack of foresight. In the years 
preceding Sir William Curzon Wyllie’s assassination, members of the India Office were 
wracked by anxieties regarding Indian students in Britain but had little real idea on how to 
curb the ‘problem’ or recourse to implement any solution. Hamstrung by a lack of better 
options, the India Office’s only real strategy was the collection of as much information as 
possible about these students, and although the presence and dangerous potential of the 
aforementioned radicals and aspiring revolutionaries was an undeniable reality, officials were 
unable to do much about them until Wyllie’s death in 1909. This tactic – the obsessive 
gathering of any and all information, however tangentially relevant, in an effort to create a 
nebulous network of knowledge – was an imported imperial strategy, born in the minds of 
British field officials and developed in the Indian hinterlands and other Crown-held 
territories before the India Office attempted to bring it back home to London. As a social 
force, information defined the government’s actions towards foreign students and provides a 
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conceptual anchor within an evolving set of policies, even as it continually proved less 
deployable in Westminster than on the Indian subcontinent. 
The British concern about Indian students was hardly confined to the imposing 
buildings of Whitehall. Small numbers of Indian students had sought higher education in 
Britain for decades before the India House came to prominence, and the public had been well 
aware of their presence in universities ranging across the island from Edinburgh and Oxford 
to the center of the capital city. Though the vast majority of arriving Indians posed no threat 
whatsoever to the empire or its citizens and had few real intentions beyond returning to India 
three or four years later with a prestigious British degree, constant British fears of 
immorality, miscegenation, and occasionally terrorism placed enough of a spotlight upon the 
foreigners from their earliest arrivals that the India Office took note and paid them an unduly 
large amount of attention. The story of Indian students in Britain hardly belongs only to the 
radicals; indeed, British reactions to the generally inoffensive domestic presences of ordinary 
young imperial subjects reveals plenty about both the British public and, by extension, those 
who governed them.  
Despite the generally mundane lives of these early Indian students, Britons constantly 
– if misguidedly – manufactured sinister undertones and possibilities where they rarely 
existed, and the perpetual grasping for validation of these fears made the few instances of 
real danger that much more memorable for both the public and the imperial government. As 
such, the events of July 1st, 1909 – unconnected though they were to all but a handful of 
Indians – captured the attention of politicians, intellectuals, and the working class, as well as 
the majority of historians responsible for the later scholarship on the period. The night was a 
turning point for both attitudes and policies towards Indian students as a whole and serves as 
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a useful entry point to the shifting British perspective towards these foreigners. What 
followed the murder was a centralization of the intelligence networks that had failed to 
prevent Wylile’s murder. Counterintuitively, increasing structure corresponded with even 
less effectiveness; nonetheless, cooperation with the British public prevented the rise of any 
similar radical groups. 
 The first chapter will introduce the framework for understanding the India Office’s 
subsequent policy towards Indian students: the information order. British field officers had 
been harnessing and manipulating the flow of information in India to monitor and crush 
dissent for decades with a general degree of success – the 1857 revolt obviously 
notwithstanding – and India Office bureaucrats used Wyllie’s imperial expertise in an 
attempt to replicate that model to monitor Indian students in Britain. Anxious about growing 
nationalist sentiment, the India Office turned to the information order as a way to counter 
anti-British feelings. However, implementing the same scheme in London as in India was 
impossible, and the India Office was forced to make several crucial changes that hampered 
its effectiveness. British-India relations in India will be established as constructed colonial 
encounters, infrequent in nature and unfailingly reinforcing the imperial hierarchy. 
 The chapter will comprise a brief history of India House culled from secondary 
literature in an attempt to chart the group’s arc in its own right. This chapter will profile the 
group’s two leaders, Shyamji Krishnavarma and Vinayak Savarkar, as well as Madan Lal 
Dhingra and his assassination of Sir William Curzon Wyllie. The history of India House in 
this chapter is that which has been most often repeated and compounded throughout the past 
century: teleological, tidy, and severely lacking. Nonetheless, a more involved construction 
necessitates an understanding of the basic facts that outline India House’s story. 
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 The third chapter will examine imperial topographies, turning to the British public in 
an attempt to explain why anti-British radicals were allowed to operate in the heart of the 
empire for as long as they did. The chapter will outline several subtle tensions at work in a 
liberal empire that extended back to its metropole. A subject Indian population had crossed 
the geographical boundary into Britain; what boundaries separated the governing from the 
governed in liberal London? Indian students occupied a unique and vexing place within 
British society; London was a legal haven within which revolutionaries were allowed to 
function unimpeded. This chapter will revisit the India Office, explaining its inability to 
initially act on India House and then chronicle the government’s coordinated crackdown on 
the group following Dhingra’s shooting.  
 The fourth chapter will cede the narration to a pair of student writings, looking for 
insights within the journals of two students who lived in London from 1906 to 1909. 
Jagmanderlal Jaini and M.P.T. Acharya were opposite personalities, and although they took 
different paths to get there, they both left London as staunch Indian nationalists. Colonial 
encounters in London, far from the uniformly repressive interactions in India, were 
unavoidable and liberating for students as they mingled with ordinary Britons, reforming 
their opinions of the British. This chapter will hear voices from the opposite side of the 
conflict in an attempt to humanize the students that the India Office so often regarded with 
ceaseless suspicion. 
 The final chapter will return to the imperial government, examining what became of 
the India Office’s final attempt to actively control visiting students. The Bureau of 
Information for Indian Students remains an understudied institution that reveals a surprising 
amount about the government’s attitudes towards these students; namely, its shifting 
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functions and relevance are treated as emblematic of the India Office’s changing role within 
a new global network of intelligence. The Bureau of Information was the empire’s spirit 
made flesh, the endpoint of an intelligence trajectory that began as amorphous information 
networks in India’s Northwestern Frontier and concluded as a single concrete building in 
downtown London. As the India Office incrementally centralized, systematized, and made 
manifest its information network, it became less useful. It’s a counterintuitive narrative: more 
active attempts at control and influence corresponded with less real power. Why the India 
Office’s methods failed is perhaps a testament to John Darwin’s decentralized view of 
empire, as explaining the department’s ineffectiveness requires an understanding of how it 
functioned within its place in a larger British society. 
 As well as a miniature historiography of India House, this thesis is a study in colonial 
encounter gone wrong. While interactions between Briton and Indian in British India could 
be carefully constructed and regulated to produce an optimally imperial solution, London 
allowed for organic encounters between foreign students and ordinary Britons. This social 
liberation coupled with the intellectual freedom Britain offered led to a collective colonial 
encounter that could no longer be controlled, though the India Office continually tried. India 
House was the ultimate manifestation of this collective misencounter, and Sir William 
Curzon Wyllie was the casualty when it spiraled too far out of control. 
As the established historiography goes, the events of July 1, 1909 were the apparent 
culmination of collective misunderstandings and bureaucratic obstacles. What seems simple 
to diagnose in such a telling as the failures of one institution is, as usual, much more nuanced 
and difficult to trace from the ground level up. For a story couched in such abstractions as 
empire, nationalism, and political protest, it can be useful to first turn to the concrete – from 
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monotonous visions of bureaucracy to examine instead the individuals who comprised it. The 
plot of this thesis begins moments before a murder, as the assassin waits on the edge of the 
stage with his nickel-plated revolver tucked out of sight somewhere in the folds of his grey 
suit jacket. Slightly out of focus behind his unkempt black hair, he is not yet the martyr who 
will star in countless adoring folk histories nor the treasonous villain whose name will find 
itself splayed across the column inches of newspapers worldwide by this time tomorrow. He 
is, for the moment, an unnoticed presence within the celebration around him, and his eyes, 
gazing across the crowd of Britons and Indians alike gathered this evening in the 
metropolitan center of the empire, have locked on the tall, mustachioed man who has just 
made up his mind to head home for the night. 
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I - Information Order, Information Panic 
 
“The real and only object is to have some control over native students in London.”1 
– M. Finucane, 1898 
 
If not for the bullet that entered his brain one summer night in downtown London, Sir 
William Hutt Curzon Wyllie would likely have been little more than the most marginal of 
footnotes in the history of the British Raj. That is hardly to say his lifetime of work in the 
service of the British Empire was unimportant; indeed, to remember Wyllie solely for his 
death outside of the Imperial Institute at the hands of a disgruntled Indian student is to ignore 
the larger role he played in British-Indian student relations. Understanding his significance in 
the early stages of the India Office’s attitudes and policies towards students is central to 
tracing the trajectories they continued to arc across after his death, but such historical 
pursuits were of little interest to the newspapers worldwide that lavished the assassination 
with a macabre mix of lovingly sensationalist details and grimly stoic condemnation. In the 
minds of the newspaper readers in 1909 that followed the incessant media coverage, the 
Members of Parliament who demanded accountability and justice for the assassin in the 
name of Her Majesty’s Government, and the unfortunate Indian students whose existences in 
                                                
1 OIOC IOR/L/PJ/6/515, file 1381 “Finucane to Daly.” 
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Britain would come to be defined by the fatal shooting, all that was worth knowing about Sir 
Curzon Wyllie was that he died.2 
 Befitting a man remembered only for dying, accordingly few satisfying accounts exist 
of Wyllie’s earlier life, which in and of itself ran fairly parallel to the course of early India 
Office relations with Indian students. The picture that emerged in obituaries and memorials 
was one of a fairly typical army officer turned bureaucrat, if a bit more distinguished than 
most of his colleagues. Born in 1848 and educated at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, 
Wyllie followed the career path of his father, a British general in India, and spent the next 
thirty-four years on the colonial subcontinent.3 After three years of combat duty, Wyllie 
joined the administrative ranks of the British Raj, serving in various secretarial and 
commissioned positions, eventually shifting from the thoroughly imperialized territories 
considered ‘British India’ – land under the direct British rule – to the princely states of India, 
hundreds of discrete political territories that nominally retained their independence while 
heavily reliant upon and informally controlled by the British. 
Wyllie became one of the most prominent British rulers in a handful of western 
princely states, cultivating what his British biographers imagined to be a great deal of respect 
among the residents on the basis of his decades-long tenure, good nature, and effective 
                                                
2 OIOC IOR/L/PJ/6/947, files 2409 & 2410 
3 F. H. Brown, “Wyllie, Sir (William Hutt) Curzon (1848–1909),” rev. Roger T. Stearn, in Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, September 2010 
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measures of governance.4 His administrative successes on the fringes of British control and 
reputed popularity among Indian princes translated into a position back in England as the 
political aide-de-camp for Secretary of State for India John Morley in 1901. It was in this 
official capacity that Wyllie spent the remaining eight years of his life and the one that 
brought him into contact with the growing number of Indian students in Britain.5 
Chief among these students in terms of eventual personal significance for the India 
Office bureaucrat was Madan Lal Dhingra, the young engineer from an upper-class family in 
Amritsar who would eventually assassinate Wyllie in 1909. Dhingra’s early gravitation 
towards the radical India House group upon his arrival in London – he had lodged in the 
group’s headquarters for six months during 1908 – and accompanying newfound nationalistic 
sentiments left his loyalist parents unsettled.6 Having met Wyllie on several occasions during 
his tenure in India, they turned to him again to steer their son away from India House’s 
radical influence.7 Whether or not Wyllie and Dhingra ever came into direct contact before 
July 1, 1909 is unclear, but the two certainly knew of each other. The possible connections 
between them will be discussed in more depth in the second chapter. 
Wyllie is a useful entry point for looking at India House because his is the name 
etched into memorials from London to Rajasthan, but the larger story of this chapter – not 
entirely discrete from that of the man himself – is that of the broader imperial government 
both in India and in London. Acting as an interpreter to the British bureaucrats who governed 
                                                
4 "The Murder of Sir Curzon Wyllie," The Manchester Guardian, (3 July 1909): 1.  
5 Brown, “Wyllie, Sir (William Hutt) Curzon (1848–1909).” 
6Alex Tickell, “Scholarship Terrorists” in South Asian Resistances in Britain: 1857-1947 ed. Rehana 
Ahmed and Sumita Mukherjee (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), 8. 
7 Rozina Visram Asians in Britain (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 159 
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India without their having ever set foot in it and the subcontinent’s local administrators, 
Wyllie was a critical link in Britain’s chain of global communication, but understanding his 
usefulness as a conduit requires an explanation of the information he conveyed. 
 Indians in London commanded an outsize share of attention from the Britons that 
surrounded them, including the India Office. By 1898, the flow of students to the metropole 
had become a strong enough current to stir some anxiety into the Government of India, 
forcing members of the India Office to acknowledge two unpleasant truths: the importance of 
these students to the future of the empire as well as the imperial government’s woeful lack of 
information about them.8 The bureaucrats of London turned to the administrators of India in 
their search for an informational foothold about who these students actually were. What 
followed was an attempt to import basic elements of the models of intelligence and 
information gathering that had been developed by British ICS officers in the subcontinent 
and transpose them onto a British setting; it was the most effective method of controlling 
students that the India Office had at its disposal. Handicapped by a lack of enforceable power 
in London, the India Office during this period put in place prototypical methods of 
information collection, surveillance, and social influence that began as fairly subtle and 
unobtrusive practices modeled on imperial practices in India. They were designed just as 
much to assuage public worries as to curb any real problems but would later – both in history 
and in this thesis – take on a far more conspicuous role in the collective experiences of Indian 
students. 
 
 
                                                
8 Paul Schaffel, “Empire and Assassination” (Undergraduate Thesis: Wesleyan University, 2012), 44. 
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Watchful Eyes and Blind Spots 
The methodological roots of the India Office’s approach ran thousands of miles long 
and nearly a century deep from London at the turn of the century to the northern reaches of 
British India during its period of commercial rule at the hands of the East India Company. 
The origins of both formal and informal intelligence networks on the subcontinent preceded 
British colonizers and began with the Mughal Empires that combined strong local presences 
with fairly well-archived elements of government, a model that the British would later 
attempt to replicate and expand upon. The topic is best addressed in C.A. Bayly’s Empire 
and Information, a thorough and penetrating study into the evolution of the British Empire’s 
approach to what he termed the ‘information order,’ the changing ways by which Britons 
obtained, organized, and employed the data they were able to gather.9 Though Bayly’s 
narrative ends well before the presence of Indian students in Britain was significant enough 
to merit any lengthy consideration, takes place almost entirely in India, and makes no direct 
mention of any of the actors connected to this thesis, it provides a crucial framework for 
understanding why the India Office approached the issue of Indians in Britain that way that it 
did. 
 For Bayly, the information order was a social force on par with that of capitalism in 
the extent to which it affected the transformation of British India, less a tangible thing than 
an omnipresent swirl of ideas. Colonization wasn’t made possible only by the technologies, 
armies, and revenues of the East India Company; rather, “the subcontinent was straddled by 
complex and highly sophisticated information system and the British had learned the art of 
listening in on these internal communications.” Tuning in to these informal networks of 
                                                
9 C.A. Bayly, Information and Empire: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 
1780-1870 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6. 
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decentralized local communications, “by controlling newswriters, corralling groups of spies 
and runners, and placing agents at religious centres, in bazaars, and among bands of military 
men and wanderers,” the British were able to monitor dissent and dissemble resistance 
movements in their infancy.10 They attempted to weld this unofficial system of regionalized 
intelligence with their own highly organized records about government and institutional 
activity, resulting in a disjointed effort to apply the same archival and organizational methods 
to information that was only available through often-unreliable local conduits: 
The British were by no means wholly ignorant of the society they were ruling. 
Conversely, the formal structures of information gathering did not necessarily 
give them a coherent insight into its workings. Their knowledge was patchy, 
incomplete and liable to atrophy. They were better at picking up warnings 
about insurrections than understanding the inner workings of Indian 
institutions. Colonial knowledge, far from being a monolith derived from the 
needs of power, existed on different levels which were imperfectly linked.11 
 
This British approach was fundamentally vulnerable, and colonial rulers relied extensively 
upon those who could connect the distinct perspectives. The key figure in maintaining a 
functional chain of information was the interpreter – sometimes literal and sometimes 
cultural – who acted as the channel between the governors and the governed, processing 
information gathered in city streets, private conversations, and printed newspapers into a 
coherent and digestible form for the ‘archivists’ of British institutionalized knowledge. The 
agent of Bayly’s description was sometimes an Indian in the employ of the Raj and other 
times an experienced Briton – the “old India hand” – who had spent a long time in the 
subcontinent and was sufficiently attuned to locals to act as a cultural interpreter. Both 
entailed a degree of uncertainty: while the former often felt pressure from both Indians and 
                                                
10 Bayly, Empire and Information, 97; Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence (London: Frank 
Cass, 1995), 9-10. 
11 Bayly, Empire and Information, 167 
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Britons, the latter’s judgments were often regarded with the suspicions that the informant had 
become too deeply imbued with the sentiments of his Indian surroundings.12 Importantly, the 
interpreter was known as such only to those above him on the chain of information; he would 
hardly be useful as an intelligence collector if those he was monitoring knew it. The 
intangibility of the intelligence network to those under its watch made it all the more 
effective. An “intelligence agent” at the local level in British India was rarely an ICS officer; 
think Rudyard Kipling’s eponymous Kim rather than a khaki-clad pukka sahib. Thus what 
proved effective for British rule in India with regards to the information order was not so 
much a disruption in the flow of information but instead an unseen monitoring of it.13 It was 
a passive approach: listening in on ordinary conversations and reading vernacular tracts and 
publications were the most common modes of surveillance. The passivity was generally 
effective, as it allowed the colonizers to collect organic information without arousing the 
suspicion that might accompany more active British forays into subaltern circles.  
The importance of the interpreter as a conduit in geographical terms is another critical 
point for understanding the eventual difference between British manipulations of the 
information order in India and in England. Beyond simply bridging two cultures, interpreters 
were the links between local activity and centralized British authority who transmitted in 
stages from hinterland to village, village to town, and town to city. “[The British] chain of 
surveillance was at its most vulnerable where the body of elite, literate officers stretching 
down from the district town linked up with the hereditary servants and information collectors 
of the village,” Bayly claimed, accentuating the network’s fragility.14 While fairly effective 
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at collecting enough information to suppress imperial threats at the local level, an increasing 
distance between source and system corresponded with an increasing risk of communication 
breakdown, misinterpretation, or misevaluation of a danger. 
As gaps in the system inevitably appeared along the weak connections between nodes 
in the intelligence network, India’s imperial rulers were plagued by occasional ‘information 
panics.’ A term coined by Bayly to describe moments of British awareness of breakdowns in 
the chain of information from ground to government upon which their ability to control the 
region depended, information panics induced fervent efforts to make up for missing 
knowledge. “In each case, officials believed that a threatening power beyond British India’s 
borders was in secret communication through religious intermediaries with disaffected 
powers,” and in response they attempted to modify their intelligence networks to account for 
the perceived threat.15   
Such information panics had a way of expanding the scope of British intelligence. 
Both Bayly and Popplewell identify the ‘thugee’ violence of the early nineteenth century as 
the initial impetus for centralizing their information-gathering practices. Unbeknownst to 
colonial officials, roving bands of Indians – ‘thugs’ as they came to be known – had 
murdered hundreds of travelers in northern India, occasionally within a mile of a British 
colonial office.16 These marauders went unknown and unchecked by the British for years, 
and the governors’ sudden realization of the threat in 1810 necessitated an upgrade in 
intelligence to deal with the ‘thugs’ specifically and other, more latent threats. Still, the 
solution remained largely localized, with no central body receiving, processing, and 
distributing intelligence until the 1830s; districts had been alerted of the ‘thugee’ danger but 
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left to their own devices to handle it. The rush to collect information about this sinister force 
was the first widespread information panic in British India, and this kind of anxiety– “the 
feeling of the fledgling colonial administration that it knew nothing of local society and that 
the locals were combing to deny it information” – would set in decades later in London, 
again as the result of unfounded British fears about Indians.17 Information panics produced 
stronger local webs of colonial intelligence but also established connections – if not always 
especially strong ones – between disparate regions.  
 Such was the state of information collection and interpretation at the Indian Rebellion 
in 1857, which many Britons attributed to a severe breakdown in political intelligence.18 In 
the revolt’s aftermath, the now state-run Government of India was slow to reinforce the 
existing intelligence structure; the number of rural policemen and intelligence collectors 
didn’t begin to rise until 1863.19 Even after the eventual uptick, the empire still “would 
continue to depend upon an uneasy cooperation between the thinly-stretched constabulary 
and village officers who were under the influence of landowners.” While the number of 
police went up, according to Bayly, “It would be wrong, however, to assume that the police 
became markedly more efficient.”20 The outward image of post-1857 intelligence networks 
may have been more aggressive, but they remained essentially the same fundamentally 
vulnerable chains as before, bound to the ideology of information collection as a uniquely 
critical component of control. The increase in police figures also signaled a shift towards 
official authority and systemization of information networks and away from the employ of 
local, informal interpreters. Though additional manpower yielded – to borrow a phrase from 
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economic thought – diminishing marginal returns due to the systematic limitations on 
effectiveness, the increase in intelligence agents had implications for the scope and direction 
of the networks going forward. While the information orders of India’s cities had long been 
the focus of British attention at the expense of the imperial fringes, a renewed emphasis on 
the less well-known patches of Indian society, particularly the princely states, and the 
Northwest Frontier, brings Bayly’s story to a close as a familiar character enters, sporting his 
still-fresh credentials from Sandhurst. 
 Though there is again hardly enough biographical material about Sir Curzon Wyllie 
to form a satisfactorily concrete picture of his life as an administrator in India, his very 
presence there in the sort of intelligence systems that Bayly and Richard J. Popplewell 
describe allows for a degree of guesswork and informed inference. He served as the India 
Office’s human connection between knowledge about India and its later attempts at dealing 
with Indian students in Britain, in effect becoming Bayly’s ‘old India hand’ transposed onto a 
British context. Wyllie was both the embodiment of imperial intelligence systems and their 
trans-national extension.21 
 Wyllie spent thirty-four years in India, arriving ten years after the 1857 Rebellion22 
when memories of the revolt were still fresh across the country and in the imperial 
government, where the consensus remained that it had been due to a particularly severe 
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breakdown in the chain of information.23 The climate into which he entered was increasingly 
that of an apparent police state, where the imperial government was in the aforementioned 
process of attempting to systematize the previously fragmented information chains that had 
plagued efficient intelligence gathering at the local level.24 It is hardly difficult to imagine 
that Wyllie’s Sandhurst training dealt extensively with the still-recent mutiny and that the 
young officer was eager to approach his service on the subcontinent with a set of ideas and 
methods fresher than his senior counterparts who might have put into action the very faulty 
system that made the Rebellion possible in the first place.  
 At the same time, the increasing paranoia that the British, and presumably Wyllie, 
displayed in their response to the revolt actually focused very little on their Indian subjects 
and more towards fears of amorphous and undefined external threats. Popplewell writes that 
historical conceptions of a ‘mutiny complex’ in the post-Rebellion Raj are misplaced, rather, 
the British adopted a fairly complacent attitude toward Indians and instead turned their 
intelligence capabilities towards religious extremists – notably a radical Wahhabi sect of 
Islam in the 1860s – and competing foreign powers, particularly Russia.25 ‘The Great Game,’ 
as the existential conflict between Britain and Russia that played out in northern India came 
to be known, was probably the main impetus for Britain’s imperial intelligence 
reorganization and development during the second half of the nineteenth century. Though the 
revolt had done deep psychological damage and taken a frightening number of British lives, 
it had never had any real chance of succeeding in overthrowing the imperial government; if 
that rebellion had been the most drastic exercise in Indian revolutionary activity, the Raj had 
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little concern about Indians themselves damaging its imperial hold on the country.26 The 
lapses in intelligence systems that the revolt had exposed were an important problem that the 
British worked to correct, but with an eye towards India’s borders rather than its heart. 
 The early locus of the Great Game was modern-day Afghanistan, which Britain 
considered a buffer between its Indian holdings and the newly Russian-controlled territory in 
central Asia. Tensions and paranoia ran high in 1878 just as William Curzon Wyllie arrived 
as a military assistant in Baluchistan; a series of diplomatic crises in Kabul triggered the 
Second Anglo-Afghan war and forty thousand British soldiers, Wyllie among them, 
eventually claimed Afghanistan as a puppet state in 1880.27 Wyllie’s first involvement in the 
Great Game was hardly his last; he spent seventeen years as a high-ranking administrator in 
the princely states that comprised the northwestern region of Rajputana and five additional 
years in Nepal. Shrouded as British India was in paranoia that an external threat was 
constantly planning attacks on its territory, it doesn’t seem too much of a stretch to imagine 
that this sort of ceaseless suspicion rubbed off on Wyllie during his more than thirty years of 
service that coincided almost exactly with the classically defined period of the Great Game, 
which definitively ended with the Triple Entente of 1907.28 Though speculative, it seems 
reasonable that these deep-rooted concerns about latent foreign threats to imperial stability, 
entrenched by decades of stressful governance, would have accompanied Wyllie home in 
1901 and continued to color his judgment even after disembarking in London. 
One particular encounter late in Wyllie’s Indian service had a particularly long-
lasting personal significance for the officer: a dispute with an England-returned Indian 
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leader. At some point during Wyllie’s stint as the Resident of Udaipur from 1894 until 1898, 
he blocked a young Indian with an Oxford degree from employment in the Updaipur Court 
and publicly reneged on his promise to introduce the man to Viceroy Elgin during a visit to 
the state.29 The young man, previously a leader in the small princely state of Junagadh, had 
circumvented British interests and run his district in direct opposition to imperial directives; 
another ICS officer had alleged that he “was a dangerous person and further suggested that 
‘all States and all Residents should be warned against him.’”30 Personally humiliated, 
professionally damaged, and thoroughly disillusioned with abuses of British rule, Shyamji 
Krishnavarma resigned his position within the government and left for England. His story 
comes later. 
 
Question Marks Across London 
Wyllie was a key figure in the discussions about Indian students even before his 
return to London. In 1898, the first symptoms of an information panic on the topic cropped 
up in Whitehall as India Office bureaucrats began to acknowledge two things: the growing 
presence of Indian students in Britain and the government’s utter lack of information about 
them.31 The office had learned that students were being brought under vaguely nationalist 
influences from their first moments in England; rumors alleged that radical Indians were 
meeting these students on the docks of arriving steamboats to whisk them away to seedy 
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lodgings populated by fiercely anti-British discontents.32 The veracity of these claims is 
questionable, especially given the demonstrated British propensity to extrapolate and project 
danger from an unsubstantial sample size both at home and in India, but they had undeniable, 
if less extreme, roots. The London India Society, headed by the pioneering Indian politician 
Dadabhai Naoroji, placed advertisements in metropolitan Indian newspapers offering to 
provide students with information about courses of study in Britain and a contact to meet 
them upon arrival in the metropole.33 The India Office was keenly aware of Naoroji’s 
influence on incoming students, sending informants to the group’s meetings and collecting 
newspaper clippings with its advertisements.34 
Anxious about the effect of anti-imperial forces on newly arrived students, a small 
number of government officers drew up a plan that would start to replicate the empire’s 
intelligence gathering systems currently in place in India. Their most basic concern was that 
of sheer numbers; for historians, the lack of any precise census of Indian students before the 
twentieth century is an annoyance, but for members of the India Office who had been 
brought up in the information-obsessive culture of the Raj, it was a critical shortcoming. The 
first step in “[enabling] the India Office to exercise some supervision and control over Indian 
students who intend to compete for public services”35 was the issuance of certificates of 
identity. Short forms for incoming students to complete upon their departure from India that 
included a basic set of information, the certificates required the student’s name, age, place of 
Indian residence, the date of his departure from India, the object of his visit to Britain, and 
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his nationality –whether he came from a British province or princely state – as well as his 
father’s name, caste, and job.36 These certificates would be for students only; although 
initially proposed as a requisite for all Indians travelling to Britain, officers didn’t want to 
effect any ostensible barriers to the inter-empire travel afforded all imperial subjects while 
simultaneously attempting “to prevent Indian students, from setting out without leaving any 
official trace at all.”37  
The bureaucrats responsible for these early designs apparently considered Wyllie an 
expert on the matter, treating him as the link between Indian periphery and colonial center. 
They forwarded him their communications and drafts of their proposed certificate templates 
and took his advice against making the certificates mandatory on the grounds that it would be 
perceived as an “unnecessary interference with the liberty of the subject.”38 Wyllie also 
recommended hiring an experienced India Office employee to act as a counterpart to Indian 
nationalists who would meet students upon their arrival and encourage a relationship with the 
government going forward. In the same letter, he admitted that a complete counterbalance of 
supposed radical forces was practically impossible, as there might always be “a certain 
number of disappointed and discontented youth who will give voice to their feelings in 
disloyalty and sedition.”39 
All parties involved agreed that the certificates were a useful tool and that their 
implementation – voluntary but strongly encouraged for students – would be a fairly simple 
process. Wyllie elicited the cooperation of the princely states in the scheme and the forms 
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were circulated as early as 1901.40 As practical instruments of intelligence, the earliest 
incarnations of these certificates of identity didn’t amount to much beyond the most basic 
practical and symbolic functions. The information they gathered was minimal and the 
certificates’ non-mandatory status prevented the India Office from coming much nearer to an 
exact census of the student population than they had been before. Appropriately little 
information exists about how many students actually completed these forms – the India 
Office Records in the British Library are littered with them until as late as 1916 but there’s 
no way to know what percentage of received certificates were archived – or how seriously 
they were regarded among students.41 Despite the racially-tinged pronouncement of Sir 
Steuart Bayley – for whom a statue in Calcutta stands as a monument to his friendly and 
respectful relationships with the Indians he governed42 – that “the well-known predilection of 
Indians for a certificate of any kind, would probably lead the majority of visitors to apply,”43 
the scheme was an “abysmal failure” according to historian Shompa Lahiri and was a useless 
tool for the government of the time and for historians that followed.44  
 As well as a means “to have some control over native students in London,” the 
certificates were also a symbolic measure in response to public anxieties about the burden 
posed by Indian students.45  They were just as much an attempt to appease emerging public 
fears about Indians in Britain as they were a reaction to the students themselves. By 1900, 
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enough rumors about immoral Indian students running amok in London had taken root in the 
public mind that citizens began to make calls for reform. Fears of miscegenation comprised a 
common anxiety, but the more pressing issue was that of destitute students: having bled their 
savings dry, students’ return voyages to India were subsidized by Britons through their 
government. Though such cases were extremely rare, they provoked enough of an outcry that 
the India Office was forced to take notice. Aside from the obvious purpose of attempting a 
census of students, Lahiri argues that the certificates of identity were intended to “weed out 
individuals who could prove to be a financial burden,” arguing that the earliest India Office 
policies regarding the students were designed with the twofold purpose of countering a 
nascent problem – bankrupt Indians in England – and persuading a concerned public 
convinced of its urgency that the issue was under control.46  Per Radhika Singha, the forms 
put a subtle onus on Indians to assuage British responsibility: “The distinctive feature of the 
certificate of identity was a column headed ‘Social or pecuniary status of father or guardian’, 
inserted to make families shoulder the cost of repatriating destitute students.”47 These 
certificates were the India Office’s first organized policy about the growing bloc of students 
in the country, but it didn’t take shape until public pressure mounted around the financial 
issue of visiting students. The continuing role of the public in both procuring and approving 
government sanctions on students will be explored more fully in the third chapter. 
 Though the certificates of identity were practically useless, they were the first real 
sign that the India Office was attempting to manipulate the information order in London 
similarly to how the imperial government had in India, but also an indication of the divergent 
path the Britain-based policy would take from its subcontinental roots. Unlike the informal 
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and intangible ways in which the British tapped into the Indian information order, India 
Office bureaucrats in London were jettisoning subtlety in an attempt to give a formal 
structure to their methods of intelligence gathering. Not content with a shaky chain of 
shadowy communication, but, as will be covered later, simultaneously bound by liberal 
ethics that kept spying off the table, the Office asked Indians to voluntarily submit to 
government oversight, even if ‘surveillance’ seemed too strong a word for what the 
certificates of identity hoped to accomplish. Nonetheless, the certificates’ physicality was a 
key departure from the intangible manipulations of the subcontinental information order and 
became a primary factor in rendering them ultimately unhelpful.  
 
Conclusion 
 Unlike in India where harnessing the information order was a way to prevent crime 
and crush dissent that involved passively listening in on existing flows of information, its 
earliest replication in England indicates that it was meant to ultimately influence its subjects 
rather than surveil them for purposes of punishment. Facing the still-vague specter of 
nationalism among Indians in England, the India Office’s earliest attempts to utilize 
information were primarily a mode of identifying potential troublemakers who merited 
additional monitoring and who might otherwise become “influential centres of disaffection” 
upon their return to India.48 For reasons that will be addressed in the third chapter, the India 
Office didn’t have much in the way of recourse for problematic students; the most it could 
really hope do was to get to them before radicals did and win them over to a positive view of 
England. Thus not only the methodology – increasingly tangible manipulations of the 
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information order – but also the aims of the India Office’s intelligence collection differed 
from the subcontinental mold. This became a pattern in the following decade – and will be 
examined in the following chapters – and helps explain why the India Office’s attempts to 
curb student nationalism were so ineffective. 
 Wyllie’s role shouldn’t be downplayed in the shape that this early policy took, 
especially upon his return to Britain in 1901. His involvement in the design and 
implementation of the certificate scheme had been largely editorial, offering suggestions and 
revisions to the London-born drafts and serving as the sort of conduit between decentralized 
local data in India and organized governmental knowledge in Britain that featured heavily in 
the information order in Bayly’s depiction of early British India. Wyllie continued to act as 
the expert on Anglo-Indian relations after his move home, both in his official capacity as 
political aide-de-camp – a position that focused on entertaining visiting Indian dignitaries – 
and in his work with Indian students. His return from India was a symbolic one for the 
direction of India Office policy towards students: as the experienced officer returned with his 
wealth of knowledge about the subcontinent, so too was the imperial model of British 
intelligence crossing the globe. Both were shaped by British minds, forged in the 
subcontinental crucible, and returned to Britain to apply their experiences. For Wyllie, this 
included a knighthood, professional respect, and a handsome salary.  
For the model of British intelligence, the transition was hardly so smooth. According 
to Popplewell, it may have been outdated before Wyllie had even arrived back in London: 
when George Nathaniel Curzon assumed the Viceroyalty in 1899, he made police 
intelligence reform a priority, citing an ineffective formal system that had failed in its aim to 
preempt and reduce crime. The modernizing infrastructure in India had made crime more 
30 
 
mobile than ever, and even the newer, post-1857 incarnations of the information order were 
too localized to handle the information flow in a region crisscrossed by telegraphs and 
railroads.49 These amorphous iterations of the information order in general functioned 
effectively, if not always efficiently, in the half century between the revolt and Curzon’s 
reforms, but that success had always been decentralized. The British were more or less 
unable to systematize the subcontinental information order as a whole because it functioned 
best on a local level in response to local threats. “[T]he trend of British ‘policy’... was to 
accept wide local variations and leave much to the discretion of its men on the spot. To do 
anything else would have been very difficult given the inadequate means to superintend 
events on the ground” wrote historian John Darwin, accentuating the administrative and 
technological limitations facing information systems.50 As the twentieth century drew nearer, 
threats could take to the rails or telegraph lines to spread beyond the boundaries of small 
communities and could no longer be contained by the decentralized intelligence methods of 
the past. If the colonial intelligence systems were already antiquated in the subcontinent, it’s 
no surprise that London, the pinnacle of global modernity, would have proved far too much 
for them to handle. The story ends in tragedy; by the end of the decade, failure to 
successfully replicate the India-based model in its new London setting left the man who had 
crossed the world alongside it dead in the center of the empire. 
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II - The India House Phenomenon 
“What can we expect of the rising generation of young Indians if we allow their minds to be 
poisoned at the fountain-head in our own country by such open incitements to crime?”1 
– ‘Corruptio Optimi Pessima’ in a letter to The Times, February 13, 1909 
 
 “Innocent of all offence, a devoted public servant, courageous and gentle, of a 
winning courtesy and constant self-denial, he was loved by the Princes and people and died, 
as he lived, in the service of India” reads the inscription hewn into a stone slab in the 
basement of St. Paul’s Cathedral. A guest, perhaps attending one of the frequent corporate 
receptions held in the church’s crypt, wanders over and through the dim lighting squints to 
study the sculpted visage that sits atop the memorial.  As they have for over a century, the 
man’s marble eyes stare downward past a thick stone mustache, averting his gaze from the 
fate that seemed written in stone long before it was spelled out here: “Assassinated July 1st 
1909 while attending an assembly of his Indian fellow subjects at the Imperial Institute in 
London.” 
Wyllie’s earthly end itself was fairly straightforward as far as assassinations go. He 
and his wife were attending an ‘At Home’ held in the Imperial Institute in South Kensington, 
an event organized by the National Indian Association that, complete with authentic food and 
music, attempted to replicate an Indian social gathering. Madan Lal Dhingra, who had not 
attended the party, arrived on the scene around eleven o’clock as Wyllie was leaving; their 
paths crossed on the steps outside the Institute and Dhingra fired five shots at point blank 
range. Wyllie died immediately along with Cawas Lalcaca, an Indian doctor who had been 
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shot in an attempt to intervene. Dhingra made no attempt to resist arrest, submitting to the 
crowd that engulfed him and the officers who took him into custody.2 
Speculation about Dhingra’s motivations for the killing was rampant throughout the 
press, the public, and the government. Some cited a personal feud stemming from Dhingra’s 
embittering prior encounters with Wyllie and a disdain for his parents’ insistence that Wyllie 
rescue him from radical influences. Others chalked it up to a degree of coincidence, 
wondering if Wyllie, a fairly nondescript bureaucrat, had actually been the intended target; a 
small number of historians conjectured that Dhingra had either confused Curzon Wyllie with 
former Viceroy Curzon or had meant to instead assassinate William Lee-Warner, who was 
not present at the gathering, and spontaneously settled on Wyllie instead. A more complete 
explanation integrates Dhingra’s personal backstory with the history of India House and its 
demagogues, notably Shyamji Krishnavarma and Vinayak Savarkar. Dhingra fit the bill as an 
assassin perfectly: a student suitably imbued with anti-imperialist feelings to justify the 
killing and enough of a personal motive to put it into motion.  
 
The Teacher and His Protégé 
 By the time that the India Office began to consider them a significant cause of 
concern, Indian students had been in Britain for over half a century. Dating back to the 
arrival of four Bengalis in 1845 who completed medical degrees in London and returned to 
India within five years, more highly qualified than any of their colonial peers.3 Though the 
flow of students that these four began was little more than a trickle for the following decades, 
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they represented the starting point for what would become a hugely influential group both in 
Britain during their stay and in India upon their return. The earliest of these so-called 
‘England-returned’4 carved out a new space in Indian society that drove increasing numbers 
of young men – and eventually women – from the imperial periphery to seek a Western 
education. The prestige of a British degree far outweighed any Indian credential and ensured 
both higher pay and a higher place in Indian society for such returning students compared to 
their peers who had never left.5 Though Indian attitudes towards Western credentials would 
gradually lose this early adoration, it provided a key impetus for the pioneering early 
students.  
 It proved a powerful incentive. Though no comprehensive records were ever created 
as to the number of students that crossed the globe to seek an education in Britain’s world-
renowned colleges and universities, the National Indian Association estimated that the 
population increased from fifty students in 1875 to 336 in 1900 and nearly a thousand by 
1910.6 It was towards the end of the nineteenth century that Indians began to write about 
their experiences abroad, a genre whose later incarnations will form basis for this thesis’s 
fourth chapter. Four Years in an English University was written by Samuel Satthianadhan 
during his studies from 1870-4 and form a baseline picture of college life for the earliest 
cadre of visiting students.7 Satthianadhan provided both a narrative of his own experiences at 
Cambridge and an outline of how students should go about applying to British universities. 
The increasing Indian interest in international education didn’t always translate into a smooth 
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process of application and acceptance. Many students had little to no idea of how the British 
admissions processes worked; university officials noted with frustration the large numbers of 
foreign students who arrived unannounced at colleges expecting to enroll without ever 
having applied.8 Satthianadhan’s book was written in conjunction with a handful of dons and 
administrators at Oxford and Cambridge, who probably would have liked to use it as a 
vehicle to correct misconceptions so as to head off uncomfortable situations like those. It was 
never a problem that universities were able to solve; the Bureau of Information for Indian 
Students that anchors this thesis’s final chapter was established in 1909 in part to distribute 
the same sort of literature and information as Satthianadhan. 
 The main paths of study for Indian students abroad were medicine, law, and 
government, as well as a small section pursuing degrees in industry and engineering. 
Possibly the single most sought-after consequence of a British education was entrance into 
the Indian Civil Service (ICS), a position attainable only with a university degree and 
successful completion of a rigorous examination process held in London. Those who 
completed the requirements joined the ranks of a predominantly white, British government 
organization that conferred a prominent, if strange, place in Indian society back on the 
subcontinent. A.K. Singh described Western education as the single most powerful social 
force in twentieth century colonial India, but many older Indians opposed the growing 
number of England-returned students, accusing them of renouncing their cultural heritage in 
becoming imperial mimics.9 Students also began to sow political discontent upon their return 
from Britain, espousing Western ideas of liberalism and exposing the apparent contradictions 
of universalism and empire. 
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 It was in this developing current of opposition that the primordial roots of the India 
House group began to take hold. Among the earliest Indians admitted to Oxford University 
was Shyamji Krishnavarma, the son of a poor family from Western India and the beneficiary 
of a government scholarship to cross the globe in his pursuit of the kind of education 
unattainable on the imperial periphery. In 1882 Krishnavarma became the first Indian to take 
a bachelor’s degree from Oxford and was called to the Bar two years later. Krishnavarma 
amassed a considerable fortune upon his return home, but his widened perspective on the 
imperial dynamics at play in India stoked the anti-British flames that had smoldered since his 
years in England; he returned to London as the nineteenth century was coming to a close. 
 There’s a subtle yet compelling bit of historiography at play in almost all the 
secondary literature of India House about why Krishnavarma left India in 1897, and it has 
more bearing on the group’s larger history than it usually gets mentioned for. The details of 
Krishnavarma’s employment in British India after his return from Oxford vary from source 
to source, but there is enough overlap to form a general timeline of his activities. Between his 
1884 arrival in India and 1893 he practiced law and ran the businesses that made him his 
fortune, after which he took a seat on the Council of Udaipur.10 He left early in 1895 to serve 
as the Diwan of Junagadh, a small district in the neighboring state of Gujarat. This is the part 
of the story in which he ran up against imperial problems: according to subsequent 
bureaucratic correspondence in September 1895, Krishnavarma had governed his district in 
direct opposition to orders from ICS officers and was removed from his position in the 
colonial government, since “the defiant attitude of the Diwan of an Indian State could hardly 
be tolerated by the British Government of India, who had always regarded not only the 
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princes but all their functionaries as sub-servient [sic] to the Resident or the Political 
Agent.”11 Such is the narrative in all Krishnavarma’s biographical sketches, but they diverge 
after this point. Some cite this removal as the incident that lit Krishnavarma’s anti-British 
flame,12 pointing the finger at A.F. Maconochie, an ICS officer that Krishnavarma had 
known at Oxford and who, as Srivastava hinted, only held his position in Gujarat thanks to 
Krishnavarma’s help.13  
 The more intriguing story comes from the sources that detail Krishnavarma’s 
attempts to get back into colonial service. After two years spent in private practice following 
his dismissal from Junagadh, Krishnavarma asked to return to his old position on the Council 
of Udaipur,14 a decision left up to the state’s Resident: Sir William Curzon Wyllie.15 
Maconochie's internal ICS pronouncement that Krishnavarma “was a dangerous person and 
further suggested that ‘all States and all Residents should be warned against him’”16 led 
Wyllie to block his request to return. As if to add insult to injury, Wyllie reneged on an 
earlier promise to introduce Krishnavarma to Lord Elgin during the Viceroy’s visit to 
Udaipur in 1896.17 These events more than those of Junagadh seem to have lent the definitive 
shape to Krishnavarma’s anti-British ideas and caused him to realize that the Raj was an 
unforgiving regime in which transgressions were not easily forgotten; his troublemaking past 
would limit his future in British India. Partially because of that and partially because of his 
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loose connection with imprisoned seditious printer and politician Bal Gangadhar Tilak, 
Krishnavarma sailed for England in 1897, never to return. 
 If this thesis is the story of India House as a colonial encounter that spiraled out of 
control, its founder’s own origin story forms a fitting prologue. Krishnavarma’s interactions 
on the subcontinent with both Maconochie and Wyllie could have been typical colonial 
encounters in which the British rulers put the insubordinate Indian subject back in his place, 
but Krishnavarma’s move to England complicated the dynamic. This familiar story of the Raj 
reasserting its dominance was the impetus for Krishnavarma’s resistance movement; instead 
of silencing dissent, it provoked even more, and it was an unusual moment in which a small 
colonial interaction gone awry eventually produced a larger one. Addressing the obvious 
implication here, it would be too simple to assert that by driving Shyamji Krishnavarma from 
India, Wyllie signed his own death warrant over a decade before the sentence was carried 
out. More than anything, it was fittingly emblematic of how far out of hand India House 
became. But that’s jumping ahead a bit. 
In London, Krishnavarma approached imperialism somewhat counterintuitively by 
offering several scholarships to young Indians wishing to follow in his steps of British study. 
Krishnavarma was a philosophical anti-imperialist, acutely aware of the unevenness of the 
British morality that awkwardly welded liberalism at home with repression and subjugation 
abroad. His style of nationalist action was to expose those incompatibilities to a British 
audience with the help of well-educated young Indians. The scholarships he endowed were 
given to prospective students “so as to equip themselves efficiently for the work of spreading 
among the people of India a knowledge of freedom and national unity”; Krishnavarma’s 
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apparent intent was to use students as catalysts of discontent upon their return to India.18 To 
the grants he attached an important stipulation: upon completion of a degree in Britain, their 
recipients agreed not to enter the ICS, eliminating a prominent motivation for many would-be 
students.19 The Indians who received Krishnavarma’s scholarships, then, were those who 
tended towards a negative view of British imperialism from the start.  
As if to provide the vessel for fermentation, Krishnavarma purchased a large house 
several miles north of the River Thames for his beneficiaries. Located at 65 Cromwell Street 
in London’s Highgate suburb, India House, as it became known, served both materially as a 
hostel for students during their English stay and intellectually as a conversion site where 
students already imbued with Krishnavarma’s radical spirit could sway newcomers and add 
to the ranks of disgruntled imperial subjects. Krishnavarma founded the Indian Home Rule 
Society and its mouthpiece, the Indian Sociologist during his residence at the hostel. A 
periodical that exemplified his intellectual anti-imperialism, the Indian Sociologist became a 
prominent object of scrutiny for the larger British population, raising questions about the 
motives and intentions of the foreigners at the center of its empire. What in India would have 
certainly been considered a seditious publication from a potentially dangerous group was 
tolerated in Britain as a matter of press freedom, and its very existence was a testament to the 
topography of empire. 
The imperial centrality of Krishnavarma’s approach remains one of the most 
interesting elements of the India House story. As historian Nicholas Owen observed, 
revolutionary figureheads were nothing new to London. The city had provided safe haven to 
anarchists, socialists, and persecuted nationalists of all stripes: Marx, Lenin, Garibaldi, and 
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plenty of other exiles had all used the metropolis as a liberal shield against their pursuers. 
That sort of radical refugee had been an escape from repression elsewhere within Europe; 
what was new in the case of Krishnavarma and his India House followers was their inward 
direction, “centripetally, to the heart of the empire that repressed them.”20 The question of 
why Britain remained so tolerant of a group advocating anti-British measures remains a bit of 
a puzzle as well as an issue to be dealt with in the following chapter. For now, it simply sets 
the curious stage for a unique story. 
 From its opening in July 1905, India House assumed a prominent place in the world 
of Indian radicals abroad. As it gained notoriety, great numbers of anti-British and anti-
imperial ideologues flocked to the hostel to deliver radical lectures, engage in debates about 
the fate of India and the British Empire, and to join in the increasingly devious schemes that 
the hostel’s ringleaders planned. Chief among these radical organizers was Vinayak 
Savarkar, a law student who “had already attracted attention to himself by his political 
activities in India.”21 An early recipient of one of Krishnavarma’s scholarships, Savarkar 
came to London in 1906 to study at Gray’s Inn in the hopes of being called to the bar. 
Savarkar’s pre-England biography was one of ominous extremism, having worked with his 
brother Ganesh in India through the secretive Abhinav Bharat society that organized 
nationalist protests against imperial rule.22 Upon his arrival in Highgate, he became a sort of 
divergent protégé under Krishnavarma, founding the Free India Society (FIS) as a militant 
alternative to the Indian Home Rule Society. Unlike Naoroji and Krishnavarma, Savarkar 
repudiated cooperation with the British and advocated total and immediate Indian 
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independence by any available means, which quickly led him to embrace the use of political 
violence.  
This militant style was a change of pace for the Highgate radicals. Krishnavarma 
himself hesitated to embrace violence as a means to further the nationalist cause; rather, his 
modus operandi was to demonstrate Britain’s historical commitment to ending tyranny and 
then to cast India’s colonial plight in that same shape, in effect reworking British liberalism 
as a tool against British imperialism.23 Krishnavarma left Highgate for Paris in the spring of 
1907 in fear of legal action against The Indian Sociologist, and the intellectual approach he 
favored left the mansion with him.24 Savarkar’s resulting takeover of the India House 
leadership signaled a shift in the group’s tactics towards outspoken renunciation of all things 
British and a violent drive to make its vision of an independent India a reality. 
 It was through Savarkar’s Free India Society that many of the most sinister actions for 
which the India House is remembered were conducted. Under his direction, members of the 
organization authored and distributed manuals on bomb making to Indians returning to the 
subcontinent.25 They shipped loads of revolvers and other weapons back to India and were 
loosely implicated in several resulting Anglo-Indian murders.26 Though definitive proof 
eluded later investigators, several witnesses claimed that one such revolver, rather than 
making the passage back to India, found itself in the hands of Madan Lal Dhingra on the 
night of July 1, 1909, allegedly gifted by Savarkar himself.27 In the popular imagination, 
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India House – Savarkar and all his revolutionary cronies – were the ones responsible for Sir 
William Curzon Wyllie’s death. 
 This is the usual imagining of India House, but such an orientalist tale of an 
omnipotent, sinister terrorist den is overly simplistic. The FIS conducted its share of minor 
militant actions, but excepting the Wyllie murder, it never truly justified the palpable dread 
with which it was commonly viewed. Paul Schaffel presents a more nuanced history of the 
group in his “Empire and Assassination,” in which he shows that rather than a tightly knit 
band of ruthless murderers, the true membership of the Free India Society didn’t extend far 
beyond Savarkar himself. Schaffel notes that while the FIS had replaced Krishnavarma’s 
moderate Indian Home Rule Society in 1907, the composition of its nominal membership had 
remained the same, implying that while India House’s mission statement had changed, it was 
the same group of foot soldiers – who had until then advocated cooperation with British 
interests – that composed the main.28 Savarkar’s militancy alienated most of the hostel 
members, and the India Office’s intelligence supports this: by 1909, reports trickled out that 
India House meetings were “very poorly attended,” mentioning the “growing distrust and 
disunion” and its “marked abatement of activity.”29 In this context of disintegrating support, 
declining membership, and a general disinclination from radical action, Schaffel chalks 
Wyllie’s assassination up to a sort of last stand for Savarkar and the Free India Society, an 
attempt to prove it was capable of backing up its inflammatory rhetoric with substance.30 
That provides an equally compelling narrative of India House’s end; rather than the flick of 
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the wrist from a powerful terrorist organization, Dhingra’s shooting was the panicked last 
gasp of a radical group that had been dying for years. 
 
Amritsar’s Resentful Son 
 Accounting for Madan Lal Dhingra has been a bit of a challenge for historians, and 
his motive, intention, and backstory are still subject to conflicting descriptions and 
explanations. As a personality, Dhingra seems lost to history; variously described as “tall, 
handsome and hefty...a dynamic patriot” by his hagiographers and an unspectacular and quiet 
youth – always of a brooding temperament – by more neutral observers.31 There are three 
recurring explanations that weave in and out of India House’s secondary history: the 
attractive ideology and personal magnetism of Savarkar, Dhingra’s fermented hatred of the 
British, and a vendetta against Wyllie common to Krishnavarma, Savarkar, and Dhingra. The 
three certainly aren’t exclusive and indeed work well when pieced together. Savarkar had a 
profound effect upon Dhingra, true, but that influence required a strong anti-British 
foundation that had been in place long before the two first met. 
 Madan Lal Dhingra’s name has become one and the same with Indian nationalism, 
but relegating him to the status of political pawn – or elevating him to political martyr – 
misses his compellingly human story. Paul Schaffel argued that the majority of India House 
students declined to act out Savarkar’s militant fantasies because they came from upper-class 
families and feared losing their place in Indian society; Dhingra came from a similar 
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background but wound up on an entirely different trajectory.32 His willingness to carry out 
the assassination in spite of its obvious consequences can only partially be explained in terms 
of India House. Madan Lal Dhingra’s personal history – and what it reveals about 
imperialism – is crucial to understanding July 1, 1909. He came from a wealthy family in 
northern India with close ties to the imperial government. His life in India was an 
unremarkable one, attending elite schools at the insistence of his parents and lacking any 
indicators of latent extremism. Schaffel noted an incongruous divergence from the typical 
biographies of India House residents: before coming to London, Dhingra had worked as a 
lascar – a menial laborer typically from the lower strata of Indian society – aboard a 
steamship.33 Here he had come into contact with the crudest elements of British society, 
exposed to the racism that underlay the Raj’s well-meaning veneer. Schaffel and others 
indicate that it was his interactions with openly hateful Britons – both his coworkers and 
those traveling on the ship – formed the basis for his hatred of Englishmen.34 
 For a fairly nondescript bureaucrat, William Curzon Wyllie had the bad luck of 
independently ending up on the wrong side of almost everyone in India House. His feud with 
Krishnavarma has been mentioned earlier and his punishment by proxy for Savarkar will be 
covered shortly, but his relation to Dhingra was perhaps the most poignant of the three. 
Wyllie had established a strong connection with Dhingra’s loyalist parents during his tenure 
in the Northwestern Frontier and his brother wrote to Wyllie in 1908 out of concern with his 
involvement in India House. Wyllie attempted to contact Madan Lal but, as touched on 
previously, whether or not Dhingra ever responded is a mystery. One chronicler of India 
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House mentioned that Wyllie made several unsuccessful attempts to bring Dhingra into the 
fold as an India Office informant, going so far as to send a young woman “to bewitch 
Madanlal and elicit secrets.”35 Rozina Visram argued that Madan Lal, by that point imbued 
with Savarkar’s ideology, came to view Wyllie as “the embodiment of the power of the 
occupier, under whose rule he, like so many other Indians, suffered.”36 Just as Wyllie had 
become the personification of colonial intelligence in his work for the India Office 
governors, so too had he come to personally represent the ills of imperial repression in the 
mind of at least one of those he governed.  
 Why Dhingra shot Wyllie out of all the figures in the imperial government has been a 
question around which no shortage of historical intrigue has swirled, but this personal history 
offers a key nuance to the narrative. While some historians have suggested that Dhingra 
mistook Wyllie for either George Nathaniel Curzon or William Lee-Warner, his family’s 
history with Wyllie makes it hard to believe that Dhingra had confused him with another.37 
Wyllie was the perfect target; he satisfied both personal and political aims. As Schaffel 
covered extensively, Savarkar had run into trouble moving his ideological followers to 
action. Resentful towards the Englishmen who mocked him, the empire that followed him 
across the globe, and the parents who constantly pressured him into a career that didn’t 
interest him, Dhingra was the rare student willing to carry out the kind of violence Savarkar 
desired, and Wyllie provided enough of a personal motivation for Dhingra to follow through. 
July 1, 1909 was the ultimate colonial misencounter, in which the subject threw the imperial 
hierarchy into chaos.  
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 Dhingra’s end came almost as swiftly as Wyllie’s. His guilt was undeniable and he 
declined a legal defense, rendering his trial moot. The judge blocked him from reading a 
statement before the court, but it was published shortly after in the Daily News and cast his 
act as one of political justice and retribution for the ills visited upon India by Britain’s 
empire.38 At the urging of John Morley, who sought to avoid a prolonged legal timeline that 
would draw further attention to the assassin and provide him a public platform for anti-
British views, Dhingra’s trial moved quickly and he was sentenced to death on July 23.39 
Less than two months after murdering Wyllie, Dhingra was hanged at Pentonville Prison in 
northern London. Despite the attempts to expedite Dhingra's trial and execution, the politics 
of his action merited notice and reflection from many Britons. Winston Churchill himself 
famously remarked that  Dhingra’s last words – “The only lesson required in India today is 
how to learn how to die and the only way to teach it is by dying ourselves” –  were “the 
finest ever made in the name of Patriotism,” exposing an uncomfortable overlap of 
condemnation and admiration in the British psyche.40 Dhingra’s body lay buried in the prison 
yard for decades until it was exhumed and returned to Amritsar in 1976. 
 
Conclusion 
 India House was a multi-layered story of colonial encounter gone awry. With its 
genesis in an administrative dispute in western India and its demise in the wake of an 
assassination, the group continually veered outside of the established template of controlled 
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imperial interaction. It is at times difficult to avoid taking a teleological approach to India 
House and explaining the group solely in terms of how its story culminated with Wyllie’s 
murder, especially given how closely entwined his life’s story was with India House’s. The 
popular narrative of a malevolent band of swarthy murderers whose lives were spent single-
mindedly planning this lone moment of violent, patriotic glory is too tidy. Wyllie’s death 
remains the most glaring event in the group’s history, but it is most useful as an entry point 
rather than a be-all, end-all. 
India House didn’t exist in a vacuum. Britons after the murder were split between 
perceptions of Dhingra as a lone extremist madman and as a pawn in Savarkar’s larger plans, 
but the public scrutiny soon after that fell on India House led to its disintegration. How India 
House was dismantled is an interesting story in itself, and one in which the India Office and 
Scotland Yard play only ancillary parts. Understanding the group’s fall requires the 
conditions of its rise, which have been only explained from one perspective so far. The 
following chapter will attempt to explain how the anti-British India House was allowed to 
thrive in London for so long and then detail why it finally ended. 
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III - British Liberalism and the Diffuse Metropolitan Imperial 
Authority 
 
“Inspector MacCarthy, the next in position to Mr. Quinn, I believe, said during our 
conversation that it is easier to police all India than to rule London City.”1 
– M.P.T. Acharya, July 1909 
 
 Even if Viceroy Curzon was correct in his 1899 conviction that the informal imperial 
information systems in India were obsolete, the myriad forces at play that allowed the 
influence of India House to expand and that failed to prevent William Curzon Wyllie’s 
assassination went far beyond that of a slightly outdated intelligence model. The two years 
before Wyllie’s death were littered with opportunities to take action against the obviously 
dangerous radical group, limited less by ignorance than a combination of tangled 
bureaucratic and legal jurisdictions as well as the complicated set of political attitudes that 
comprised Britain’s social liberalism. Indeed, the very discourse of failure isn’t entirely 
accurate in chronicling the interplay between Indian students and their host country, or at 
least their imperial government; Wyllie’s death wasn’t a failure on the part of the India 
Office so much as it was a consequence of Britain’s diffuse societal responsibility for the 
radicals.  
Counterintuitively, the metropolitan center of the British Empire was the safest 
location for the headquarters of an anti-British resistance movement; how this was allowed to 
happen is one of the most complicated and fascinating elements of the India House story as 
well as a prologue for the narrative of post-India House students. It also has a way of 
demonstrating the unique importance of Indian students to the history of the empire: the 
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implications that followed from the legacy of India House were implications about the very 
essence of empire and the modes of imperial power. This was a singular period during which 
students – albeit a small and perhaps unrepresentatively extreme portion of them – briefly 
transcended their position in British society and served as a medium through which crucial 
imperial discourse was forced to flow. In doing so, India House members left an unfortunate 
and indelible legacy of public distrust for their peers to carry. That will come later in the 
chapter, exploring how what Alex Tickell termed the “repressive legal topography of 
empire” affected the larger student population and the India Office’s ability to monitor and 
influence them.2 The introductory story – how not only the India Office, but Britain as a 
whole failed to curb India House’s rise and Wyllie’s assassination – is multi-layered and first 
requires a look into British liberalism.3 
 
Social Citizenship and the Liberal Benefit of the Doubt 
 The very existence of the British Empire seems couched in a bit of a philosophical 
conundrum, as the institutionalized subjugation and exploitation of human masses the world 
over appears squarely at odds with a society thoroughly steeped in the liberal, Lockean ideas 
of natural rights, essential equality, and social contracts. “How did ideas of equality, liberty 
and fraternity lead to empire, liberticide, and fratricide? Similarly how did a commitment to 
toleration lead to such patronizing and unsympathetic characterizations of the ways in which 
strangers lived their lives?” asked Uday Mehta, whose Liberalism and Empires sought to 
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bridge the apparent gulf between liberal British attitudes and the repressiveness of its 
empire.4 Jennifer Pitts reiterated the dissonance: “The endorsement of radically different 
political standards for different people implied by imperialism requires theoretical 
justifications that form an often unexpected and indeed uncomfortable element in liberal 
thought in the nineteenth century,” with reverberations that lasted well into the twentieth 
century and the course of this thesis.5 The philosophical chasm evidently wasn’t as wide as 
might be imagined. Mehta and Pitts both keyed on liberalism’s progressive nature in 
resolving the ideological conflict: imperialism in the name of improving subaltern lives was 
considered an admirable liberal aim. It was an approach that necessarily discredited Indian 
experience and history as Britain sought to remodel Indian society in a Western image – 
progress warranted paternalism. Liberal imperialism marginalized the distinct identities of its 
subjects and conflated ideas of Britishness with objective superiority over Indianness, but the 
end goal of a rebuilt India was enough of an incentive to pacify most critics of the process. 
 While liberalism and empire were resolved fairly easily on the colonial periphery, the 
presence of colonial subjects in the metropole was another matter entirely. If there was a 
legal topography undergirding maps of the British Empire by 1900, there had been a moral 
counterpart alongside it for over a century. In 1788, Warren Hastings was brought before 
Parliament to face charges of impeachment over his management of the East India Company. 
The trial went unresolved for seven years, but it began with opening remarks from Edmund 
Burke, the larger than life statesman whose politics came to define modern conservatism. In 
his address, Burke repeatedly made reference to a “geographical morality” that typified the 
                                                
4 Uday S. Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 190. 
5 Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005), 4-5. 
50 
 
Company’s imperialism; this was a topography in which liberalism’s ‘universalist’ principles 
of equality hardly extended beyond the shores of Britain and were unrecognizable in the 
colonial periphery.6 Burke found the uneven morality troubling, and argued throughout the 
trial that what constituted a crime in Britain should be likewise condemned in India. Though 
Hastings was eventually acquitted, Burke’s iteration of geographical morality outlined the 
discourse that India Office officials and members of the British public would later draw from 
as Indian students flocked to London. 
The dilemma was dredged up from parliamentary annals to the forefront of British 
though with the arrival of Krishnavarma and the radicals of his ilk: what rules applied to 
Indians in Britain? The English public and government had an intuitive sense that the 
newcomers were outsiders, but along what lines was that division drawn, and what kind of 
treatment were they entitled to?7 It wasn’t strictly a geographical delineation wherein 
everyone existing in the British Isles was free and everyone existing on the subcontinent was 
subjugated; that made no exceptions for travelers whose intra-empire movement was a right 
of citizenship. It wasn’t exclusively a racial divide either, as the fundamental principles of 
liberalism at play in England, if not in India, allowed for equality regardless of race.8  
Unraveling imperial dichotomies like these has been a tricky pursuit for historians in 
recent memory, with several attempts to explain the dynamics at play with regards to both 
Indians in London as well as a broader imperial context. As Ann Stoler and Frederick Cooper 
wrote in the foreword to their seminal Tensions of Empire, “The most basic tension of empire 
                                                
6 Pitts, A Turn to Empire, 77. 
7 Sumita Mukherjee, Nationalism, Education and Migrant Identities, 20. 
8 Nicholas Owen, “The Soft Heart of the British Empire,” 146. “Colonial rule at the metropole could 
be neither comfortably left to the workings of ‘invisible’ self-discipline, nor governed by the racial 
differentiation employed in India.” 
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[was that] the otherness of colonized persons was neither inherent nor stable; his or her 
difference had to be defined and maintained.”9  Particularly true in this specific setting, the 
incongruous juxtaposition of liberal Western attitudes with imperial subjugation was an 
awkward contradiction that didn’t resolve naturally in Britain and required a mechanism to 
quiet the dissonance. Historian Nicholas Owen later expanded on one such delineating 
apparatus that defined the uneasy boundary between different populations in London by 
proposing that Indian students could be treated as equals in the metropole provided they 
conformed with British norms. Residence in Britain offered them political protection from 
the kind of persecution they would face for illegal actions in India, but acceptance into 
British life was a revocable privilege doled out by private intermediaries. Owen wrote that 
“The celebratory accounts of resistance that dominate the secondary literature [of India 
House] go wrong because they assume that colonial rule at the metropole was simply racially 
formed before arrival…Because colonial rule at the metropole held out the possibility of 
acceptance, however conditionally, it placed Indians in a dilemma too.”10 This was a fluid 
characterization of imperial acceptance that goes a long way in explaining both why India 
House radicals were initially allowed to flourish and also why they were eventually driven 
away. He describes life in London for these students – and by extension, their less radical 
counterparts – as a sort of probation in which the British public greeted them with a liberal 
benefit of the doubt, but their moral character was under constant assessment; within this 
framework, the Wyllie murder was the impetus for the revocation of what might be best 
described as their social citizenship.  
                                                
9  Frederick Cooper & Ann Stoler, “Between Metropole and Colony,” in Tensions of Empire 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 7. 
10 Owen, “The Soft Heart of the British Empire,” 147. 
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This informal membership into British society extended the protections afforded all 
Britons to Indian visitors on a provisional basis while maintaining an underlying imperial 
hierarchy. It allowed for the resolution of geographical imperial dissonance by superficially 
placing Indians and Britons on roughly the same societal standing in the metropole while also 
reinforcing the more powerful underlying imperial strata by leaving the power to determine 
social citizenship in the hands of the British.11 Situating liberalism within imperialism isn’t a 
new concept; indeed, the two may be more compatible than initially seems possible. Uday 
Mehta’s “Liberal Strategies of Exclusion” in Tensions of Empire explored the feasibility of 
imperial repression within a superficially universalist philosophy: “...behind the capacities 
ascribed to all human beings there exist a thicker set of social credentials that constitute the 
real bases of political inclusion...What is concealed behind the endorsement of these 
universal capacities are the specific cultural and psychological conditions woven in as 
preconditions for the actualization of these capacities.”12 While Britons treated Indians as 
nominal equals in the metropole, their difference was undeniable, if hard to pin down; simply 
put, ordinary British citizens knew that Indians were different from them but remained 
unsure of how to vocalize that difference within the discourse of liberalism. Social 
citizenship gave them a mechanism to act as liberal endorsers while simultaneously 
reinforcing the hierarchy they sat atop. It was a reincarnation of Burke’s detested 
geographical morality, assigning social privileges to Indians in London to a degree that far 
exceeded what the same individuals would have received in India. 
                                                
11
 “In Britain civil liberties were not enforceable rights, but privileges which, for their full value, 
required endorsement by British intermediaries.” Owen, “The Soft Heart of the British Empire,” 181. 
12
 Uday S. Mehta, “Liberal Strategies of Exclusion,” in Tensions of Empire, ed. by Frederick Cooper 
and Ann Stoler, 61. 
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This is an important nuance in chronicling the integration of official and unofficial 
powers in the oversight of foreign students. Richard J. Popplewell wrote that “The British 
government and British law effectively protected the Indians in London from the justice 
administered by the Government of India, a strange anomaly which was largely attributable 
to a strong attachment to ‘liberal’ values within British governing circles.” This was a fair 
assessment of the philosophical barrier between imperial government and subjects abroad 
that he unnecessarily characterized in his subsequent claim that “This was the single most 
important cause of the failure by the authorities to respond to the threat which the nationalists 
posed.”13 Liberalism had implications on both official and unofficial fronts in Edwardian 
London, and while it weakened the government’s ability to formally control Indian students, 
it strengthened the English public’s informal control over them. Popplewell was correct in 
emphasizing the imperial government’s powerlessness in dealing with extremists, but he 
neglected to account for the role of Owen’s private intermediaries that dictated how seriously 
to take the nationalist threat; in turn, Owen stops short of examining what powers the 
imperial government was allowed to utilize against a group whose members’ actions had 
implicitly renounced their social citizenship in England. The two narratives work best when 
put into dialogue – when Popplewell picks up where Owen leaves off – which is one of the 
aims of this chapter. 
This historical guideline within the confines of liberalism – societal acceptance 
contingent on adherence to British norms – is particularly effective at explaining the rise and 
fall of India House, but also sets up well for eventually charting attitudes toward typical, non-
militant students after 1909.  The role of liberalism in Owen’s account of India House forms 
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an almost literal narrative arc of its own, tracing the initial acceptance and private support the 
students enjoyed on their protected upswing and then the reversal and downward slide 
toward persecution and exile. On the surface, the tipping point for India House appears to 
have been the evening of July 1, 1909, but momentum against those students had been 
building within official circles for some time before then.  
 
Highgate’s Social Shield 
Before delving into how Owen’s unofficial intermediaries finally brought India 
House down, it’s worth noting how liberalism protected the radicals in the first place. “The 
India Office found it could do very little about what Secretary of State John Morley termed 
‘these nests of diablerie.’ In London, basic liberal freedoms of movement, expression and 
association and the right to a fair trial could not be suspended for Indians” wrote Owen, 
noting that the protection afforded to the students had a counter effect on the government’s 
ability to officially control them.14 Liberal norms constituted a key element of the difference 
between governmental attempts at surveillance in Britain and in India. While the Indian 
Penal Code was largely unbound from these sorts of restrictions on what constituted 
acceptable methods of collecting intelligence, policing the same people in Britain required a 
different approach.15 While some in the India Office were in favor of a heavier police focus 
on Indian dissidents in London, their boss was not. Morley, a staunch Liberal, strongly 
                                                
14 Owen, “The Soft Heart of the British Empire,” 150 
15 [Morley] felt that there should appear to be no need for repression at home just when liberal 
measures were being introduced into India itself.” Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence, 128, referring 
to the 1909 Indian Councils Act that expanded India’s legal capabilities towards self-government. 
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opposed the kind of explicit surveillance that characterized intelligence on the subcontinent 
and forbid the use of spies under the formal purview of the India Office.16 
Thus, the official crackdown that finally split India House in 1910 was only possible 
after the revocation of their provisional citizenship voided their liberal protection; until 
Wyllie’s death, private British society had been superficially warm towards at least the idea 
of the radicals’ presence in London and wielded more imperial power than the government 
itself. A crucial element of England’s appeal to radicals was the evident confusion within 
official circles regarding what rules applied to colonial subjects and who would enforce 
them. Per Owen,  
Power was not concentrated in the hands of the state, but dispersed among 
many non-state institutions, actors, and associations that stood apart from the 
state...Although the state did not control them, they were nonetheless governed by 
internally enforced codes of behaviour...Being a ‘reasonable litigant’ in court, a 
‘respectable lobbyist’ at Westminster, a ‘responsible journalist’ in Fleet Street or a 
‘good chap’ at university was a necessary condition for equal treatment. Furthermore, 
full entitlement to civil liberties could not be obtained by Indians directly, but only 
via British intermediaries.17 
 
These intermediaries – Owen cites MPs, editors, college tutors, and the benchers at the Inns 
of Court as prime examples – had more influence in deciding a foreigner’s status than the 
imperial government, forming a largely impermeable social shield along liberal philosophical 
lines that protected colonial subjects, whether they were loyalists or dissidents. This can also 
help to explain the widespread public anxieties that, among other things, sparked the 
                                                
16 Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence, 127. William Lee-Warner, though often 
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17 Owen, “The Soft Heart of the British Empire,” 162. 
56 
 
certificate of identity scheme in the first place: unofficial British bodies had an extraordinary 
degree of influence over foreigners in the metropole. Early in the history of Indian students, 
the few who had become destitute or violated British social codes were the impetus for the 
first reforms, due in large part to their relation to private English life. For the majority of 
ordinary students between 1900 and 1909, however, the difference between being judged in 
official and unofficial circles was academic; most had committed no mistakes of substance 
that would have been grounds for either governmental or private rebuke. 
 If it was the benchers and press editors of London that wielded actual influence over 
foreign students, the city itself set a perfect, quintessentially imperial stage.18 Recall Jonathan 
Schneer, who argued that “imperialism was central to the city’s character in 1900, apparent 
in its workplaces, its venues of entertainment, its physical geography, its very skyline; 
apparent, too, in the attitudes of Londoners themselves...the imperial metropolis was not so 
much a machine for making money as it was, at least potentially, a machine for making 
imperialist-minded citizens.”19 In this vein, those tasked with soft imperial power were not 
only aware of their influence, they were imbued with it by virtue of the city they inhabited. 
This fits together nicely with Owen’s argument to form a picture of London through a 
student’s eyes as a place where harsh colonial laws no longer applied but where the empire’s 
influence was unavoidable. All in all, as Owen suggests, “Britain [was] more a stifling than a 
                                                
18 This is a discussion that could most likely be applied to most of Britain but that I, for the sake of 
centrality and relative brevity, will confine to London. The poignancy of the metropole makes for compelling 
history, and most of the literature on the topic focuses likewise on the city; while the same diffuse and informal 
imperial authority may have been exercised across Britain, nowhere was it more evident and omnipresent than 
London. 
19 Schneer, London, 1900, 13. 
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supportive place,” a legal and intellectual safe haven that nonetheless reserved the ability to 
turn limitless social power against dissidents.20 
  London had played host for decades to moderate Indian nationalist voices. Dadabhai 
Naoroji was chief among them. The British Committee of the Indian National Congress and 
other organizations of its ilk were anti-imperial groups in the metropole, yes, but their 
nationalism was contingent upon engaging with British rulers in an attempt to demonstrate 
their ability to self-govern.21 Nationalism by emulation was much more tempered than that 
which India House represented. This was a societally acceptable discourse for Indian 
nationalism and the public pushback was minimal; Naoroji’s social citizenship was never 
truly in danger. 
 The members of India House were the first Indian students to truly take advantage of 
London as a patch of legally unmonitored freedom for explicitly anti-British, rather than 
simply anti-imperialist, ends. “We were always expecting a raid accustomed as Indians were 
to such possibilities, nay certainties, in India. But the Police in London was more 
circumspect than in India, since they were unable to raid unless they had certain evidence 
that something terrible was being perpetrated” recalled one student, expressing a degree of 
incredulity at the freedom afforded to him and his peers at the Highgate hostel.22 Even such a 
cursory grasp of British restraint as his empowered India House members; a more nuanced 
understanding of the British laws in action confirmed the leaders’ senses of security. As Alex 
Tickell described it, “Krishnavarma and Savarkar both trained as lawyers and were keenly 
aware of disparities in the repressive legal topography of empire; in fact their greater freedom 
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from prosecution and censorship in the metropolitan centre, beyond the powers of the Indian 
Penal Code, was one of the immediate attractions of a base in London.”23  
 Almost by accident, Krishnavarma had found a weak spot of the British 
Empire...Attachment to liberal values at home meant that even as repression was 
visited on Indians in India, there was much less restriction on their activities in 
England. The press was largely free to publish what it wanted...Political meetings on 
Indian questions were sometimes attended by India Office officials, but were not 
subject to the surveillance or bans deployed in India. In India, postal censorship had 
been a common nuisance for Extremists, but there was little of it in England.24 
 
This awareness of imperial loopholes played more into Krishnavarma’s philosophical anti-
imperialism than Savarkar’s militancy, but putting Tickell into conversation with Owen 
leaves readers with a sense that both of India House’s leaders had perhaps overvalued British 
headquarters. They had leaned too much on its legal merits and neglected to consider their 
own slipping social standing.  
 By the time that unofficial opinion was turning on India House, Krishnavarma had 
long since departed for Paris and Savarkar now bore the full brunt of British dissatisfaction, 
unaware of – or perhaps unconcerned with – the shifting pressure. This is where Paul 
Schaffel makes an important contribution to understanding the pre-assassination decline of 
India House: by 1909, Savarkar’s commitment to violence had alienated almost every 
member of India House and had left him nearly alone in his disregard for public opinion. By 
assuming that his legal immunity in Highgate translated into complete societal autonomy, 
Savarkar missed what had long been evident to even the hostel’s more outspoken radicals: 
seditious behavior had the potential to damage their personal prospects. “These [common 
members of India House] were not like Savarkar: they and their families made up the social 
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and intellectual elite of India, and although they were willing to discuss revolution, to 
actually act out against the British was a risk that most were not willing to take...For most 
members of India House, either law or medical students, even a minor offense...could have 
jeopardized an entire career.”25 Predictably, Savarkar’s aggression caught up with his own 
societal aspirations: he was blocked – partially on the recommendation of none other than 
Curzon Wyllie26 – from being called to the Bar early in 1909.27 “[Savarkar and one other 
radical] have been accused of being concerned in the propaganda which is said to have its 
headquarters in this country at ‘India House’...It is alleged that the two Indian students of 
Gray’s Inn have frequented ‘India House’ and that one of them has been one of the 
‘managers’ of that institution” read an announcement in The Times in May 1909, a 
condemnation of Savarkar that implicitly marked India House as an entity capable of 
conferring guilt by association.28 The Inns of Court were clearly turning on the group by 
then; in addition to postponing Savarkar’s call to the Bar, Krishnavarma had officially been 
disbarred less than two weeks prior for quoting the Indian Sociologist in a column he penned 
for The Times in February 1909.29 The legal education system and the British press were 
prominent unofficial intermediaries responsible for deciding social citizenship, and India 
House had very publicly lost their collective blessing even before Dhingra’s shooting. 
 Printed India House propaganda had long been tolerated in Britain as a matter of 
press freedom, but by early 1909 even that tie was fraying. Krishnavarma had never run up 
                                                
25 Schaffel, “Empire and Assassination,” 39-40. 
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27 Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence, 131. 
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permanently blocked from the Bar; rather, befitting this liberal narrative, his call was postponed until an 
investigation into his alleged seditious activity provided a definitive conclusion.  
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against the problem of finding an avenue for publishing his moderate nationalist literature 
during his time in England; his opinion pieces were regularly printed in The Times and even 
the more radical Indian Sociologist had backers in the form of British Leftist publishers. 
Savarkar’s more inflammatory propaganda had already strained relations with his publishers, 
however, and his attempts to publish his newest book, The Indian War of Independence, were 
the breaking point. An extremist retelling of the 1857 sepoy revolt as a thoroughly nationalist 
attempt at revolution against British rule, the manuscript was condemned by the India Office 
and banned in British India even before its publication, rendering it untouchable for British 
printers. M.P.T. Acharya – one of Savarkar’s few truly dedicated lieutenants whose story will 
be examined in greater detail in the following chapter – described the process of trying to 
publish it, demonstrating the group’s awareness of both imperial topography and its 
members’ own social citizenships: 
Since it could not be published in India in Marathi, Savarkar wanted it to be 
published abroad even in English. In England no firm would print it, although the 
materials were culled from books and documents published in England itself. If any 
Indian undertook to publish it in England or Europe, he was likely-nay, certain to be 
prosecuted...Many of the students who did not sympathise with [Savarkar’s] views of 
independence or even were afraid of association with him were willing to contribute 
funds for the publication...All were afraid that their studies and career would be 
ruined if their names leaked out in that connection. We found a German agent for a 
Continental printing firm and he undertook to get it printed. But when he saw the 
contents and showed it to a lawyer, he said his business would be ruined if the firm is 
known to undertake such works.30 
 
The strain that Savarkar’s quest for publication placed not only on printing firms but on his 
own followers was intense, and doubtless contributed to India House’s attrition by 1909. His 
pushes for action cost Savarkar his physical space within India House itself; following a 
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falling-out with Harran Singh in May 1909, Savarkar left the hostel and conducted the 
activities of the FIS off site. 
 Dhingra’s murder forced students’ hands: either condemn India House and attempt to 
hold on to their provisional citizenship or remain outspoken extremists and suffer the societal 
consequences. “Ironically the British public opinion though avowedly committed to the 
intrinsic worth of freedom of expression and open debate, the hallmark of a liberal society, 
started resenting such ventilation of feelings and ideas by Indians” wrote Malwinder Waraich 
of the palpable shift in British attitudes following the shooting.31 The press became a medium 
for anti-nationalist diatribes, peppered by columns from ex-government officials condemning 
Indian nationalism in all its forms. Extremist and moderate alike were deemed seditious and 
pressured to immediately adopt pro-imperial views at the risk of losing their social 
citizenship. Virendranath Chattopadhyaya, an outspoken revolutionary who had co-edited the 
Indian Sociologist during his stay at the Highgate house, penned an editorial in The Times 
criticizing this homogenization of perceived anti-Britishness; less than a week later, he had 
been disbarred from the Middle Temple.32 As a column published on July 6, 1909 
demonstrated, anything less than complete renunciation of nationalist sentiments would lead 
to a suspicion of complicity with the murder: “If the Nationalists...act up to their professions 
[of innocence] and strenuously exert their undoubted influence to discourage the gospel of 
sedition and violence...we shall put faith in the assurances we receive that no underground 
links exist between the open and the secret movements.”33 Statements like these strongly 
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implied a larger conspiracy in the Wyllie murder, referring to the “undoubted influence” of 
organized nationalists that could move impressionable young Indians to violence.  
The public’s fear of conspiracy paved the way for the India Office to take action 
against India House by connecting the group with the actions of one of its members. Retired 
ICS officer F.A. Steel authored a letter to The Times in which he decried John Morley’s 
plodding, deliberate measures in retaliating against India House: 
The remarks of many [Liberals] force me to implore the British public no 
longer to allow itself to be hoodwinked by the feeble, maudlin drivel with which it is 
sought to confuse the issues in India...I say it advisedly as one who has tried to touch 
the Indian temperament, and I am sure all with experience of that temperament will 
bear me out, there is no line of demarcation in the minds of the millions of Indians 
between the ‘unrest’ which produces a crop of disloyal questions in Parliament or 
edits a paper like India and the anarchism which wantonly murders a friend simply 
because he is an Englishman. Life is very simple to the ploughman at his plough; he 
cannot differentiate between disloyal deeds. Why should we?34  
 
The vitriol of Steel’s letter stood in marked contrast to the tempered response of the India 
Office and presented a clear boundary line for students, claiming that disloyalty to any 
degree was tantamount to conspiracy to murder. If Indian students had until then enjoyed the 
British public’s liberal benefit of the doubt, Steel’s insistence that Britons should treat them 
with unrelenting suspicion showed that such patience had eroded completely. This kind of 
reaction put an unfair pressure on the India Office: previously hamstrung by liberalism’s 
protection of India House, Morley and his bureaucrats were harangued almost immediately 
after Wyllie’s death for not acting swiftly enough to bring India House down. This public 
pressure allowed the India Office to change its policy towards students more generally, as 
will be covered more extensively in the final chapter, but it took cooperation from multiple 
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imperial agencies and the formation of a new intelligence network to fully topple India 
House itself. 
 
Liquidating India House 
 This is the point to strike a balance between the histories of Nicholas Owen and 
Richard Popplewell and acknowledge that however powerless the imperial government had 
been in preventing the rise of India House, the revocation of the group’s social citizenship 
also had consequences for how the India Office and Scotland Yard could attack it. Absent the 
protection of liberal Britain, the agencies – increasingly in coordination with authorities 
based in India – were able to employ more traditional modes of espionage and pressure 
against the radicals. The imperial government was able to manipulate the empire’s 
topography against them; while India House members had stood atop a protected legal peak 
in London, they began to slide back towards danger after Scotland Yard chased them out of 
Britain. The on-the-fly yet effective integration of multiple policing agencies in the aftermath 
of the Dhingra shooting demonstrated the restrictive power of the empire’s official bodies 
that had bubbled underneath the India House situation for years but had been restrained by 
liberal norms until Wyllie’s death. 
 The official crackdown that finally split India House was the result of a new 
partnership between the India Office and Scotland Yard, coupled with cooperation from the 
Criminal Intelligence Department (CID) in India. Previously separated by petty bureaucratic 
disputes over jurisdiction and the difficulties of including a department on the other side of 
the globe, the agencies begrudgingly joined forces following Wyllie’s death; the India Office 
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acted as the brains of the operation and Scotland Yard and the CID provided the manpower 
and policing experience. With no real precedent, their combined response was largely 
improvised, rather than as cohesive or meticulously planned as some have suggested.35 By 
the end of August 1909, the CID had sent a pair of Indian agents for the purpose of 
infiltrating India House in conjunction with India Office and Scotland Yard efforts to prove 
the hostel’s connection to the since-executed Dhingra. Most of the students in Britain had by 
that point either denounced India House or renounced their social citizenship, and the official 
aim was to demolish the remaining radicals through legal means rather than continuing to 
leave their fate to liberal social forces.. 
 Morley initially sought to establish Dhingra as a lone actor as an attempt to discredit 
his political motivations, but the opportunity to connect him to India House – and in doing so 
allow Scotland Yard to finally split the group – proved a more enticing approach. These new 
methods weren’t immediately effective and demonstrated the lingering restrictions of 
liberalism that hampered police action. While Dhingra was tried and executed with unusual 
speed, establishing the direct link between him and India House that would allow the 
government to take action against the group proved difficult. As the virulent columns that 
peppered The Times and other newspapers showed, Morley’s cautious approach was neither 
popular nor effective. Rather than prosecuting students outright, the agencies’ first move was 
a more implicit threat.  “As the Scotland Yard could not prevent movements of any person in 
the name of preventing crime, they asked [my friend] to induce me to leave for America” 
wrote one India House member in the days immediately after Wyllie’s death when the 
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agencies were still organizing their efforts.36. Days later, the same student, M.P.T. Acharya, 
assaulted an English barrister at a public meeting about Dhingra and was detained by the 
police: “I was taken into a separate room by secret police and I thought they were going to 
take me into a lock-up that night. But they simply asked for my name and address and let me 
go. I was surprised and learnt that in England beating a man is a private civil affair and the 
aggrieved party had to go to court.”37 Acharya’s record of events is a fascinating counterview 
against Popplewell’s assessment of the crackdown, as it shows what effect the governmental 
efforts actually had on India House members. In a follow-up visit to Scotland Yard offices 
from the assault at Caxton Hall, the police chief attempted to enlist Acharya’s help as a spy: 
“He told me if I cared, I could have help for study if I found out if there was any conspiracy 
and who were in it. I declined to do such a job as it was neither of my liking nor in my 
interest.”38 This intimation was one of the first instances that any branch of the government 
had attempted to place an informant within Indian student circles; there had been several 
casual informants who passed information along to individual members of the India Office, 
but none under the direct auspices of government.39 Morley had largely forbidden spying on 
students as a matter of liberal principle; Acharya’s exchange with the head of Scotland Yard 
suggested that protection along that line and others like it was vanishing almost immediately 
after Wyllie’s murder. 
 In the absence of liberal norms, Scotland Yard and the India Office increasingly 
employed traditional methods of espionage to prove India House’s malfeasance. Scotland 
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Yard was ill-suited to the task; there hadn’t been any major terrorist activity inside Britain 
since the 1880s, and the cultural and linguistic divides between Britons and Indians were an 
enormous obstacle in attempting to monitor the radicals.40 By August 1909, the India House 
mansion in Highgate was vacant, but many of its former lodgers and members of the FIS 
were still in London.41 Scotland Yard enlisted many of their landlords as informants and 
tasked detectives with following prominent FIS members day and night.42 Establishing a link 
proved slow going, but the presence of spies in the group’s midst had made FIS members 
extremely paranoid by 1910; Savarkar, now lodging above a dingy restaurant in Holborn, had 
cut himself off from almost all his former friends and allies. He had been under constant 
indirect assault since July: his brother had been sentenced to life in prison, his father-in-law 
had been fired without cause, and his sister was constantly harassed by police in India.43 To 
make the attack even more pointed, the CID sent a seasoned detective from India to assist 
detectives in London. John Wallinger spoke three Indian languages and had broken up 
several revolutionary plots in princely states; he was the first bond in an inter-agency 
connection that would become the Indian Political Intelligence Office. The reach of this 
shadowy organization will be further explored in the final chapter. 
 Though the spies and informants failed to yield evidence of a direct conspiracy 
stemming from India House or the Free India Society, the authorities were nonetheless able 
to prosecute many prominent members by exploiting a familiar topography. Absent any 
direct, convincing connection between Dhingra and a larger conspiracy, the India Office and 
Scotland Yard sought to scare students out of Britain, often back to India where they might 
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be subject to harsher laws. “Accepting that it was impossible to police Britain as they did in 
India, the authorities now sought to ensure that Indian agitators were subject to Indian rules, 
and enjoyed no benefit from the freer atmosphere of Britain” wrote Nicholas Owen; in an 
ironic twist, the same legal unevenness that had protected radicals in London was reversed as 
they were pressured to return to India and its repressive laws. B.C. Pal, publisher of a 
notorious anti-British journal, found that the Raj had outlawed its distribution in India. His 
income dried up and London’s expenses forced him to return to the subcontinent, at which 
point he was immediately arrested for sedition.44 Even Britons sympathetic to the radical 
cause found themselves in trouble; the Indian Sociologist, long a focal point of British 
criticism, was similarly shut down. Though it was written by radicals in Paris, its distribution 
was significantly hampered following the successful prosecution of two of its British 
publishers in late 1909.45 The nationalist cause was dwindling: most Indians had renounced it 
and the remaining proponents had been driven out of the country and imprisoned, and, its 
views had been suppressed in the press. This was only made possible with the implicit 
approval of Britain’s private intermediaries; until Dhingra gave the government a tangible 
reason to act against agitators, Britain’s liberal society had prevented the kind of espionage 
and harassment that finally brought the group down by mid-1910. The empire’s legal 
topography had inverted under the radicals’ feet and now worked against them to enable their 
prosecution away from Britain. 
Conclusion 
The difference between the impotence of the India Office and the integrated, well-
organized crackdown that finally toppled India House was its tacit acceptability in the wake 
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of revoked social citizenship. India House’s members had either scattered or been arrested; 
Savarkar was no exception. Scotland Yard and the India Office had been able to formulate a 
sufficiently strong case for his extradition to India by the time he fled Britain in January 1910 
to join Krishnavarma and another group of nationalists in Paris; he made an ill-advised return 
trip to London several months later and was promptly arrested.46 He was put on a ship 
destined for India to face harsher sedition and conspiracy charges, but as the steamer made a 
stop at Marseilles, Savarkar leapt from a porthole and swam to the French shore. What 
followed was a legal nightmare: despite his apparently successful stunt in an attempt to claim 
asylum, a French policeman turned Savarkar back over to the British.47 An appeal at The 
Hague upheld Savarkar’s extradition and he was sent to India as planned, where he received 
two life sentences in prison.  
The government had dismantled India House’s leadership, but the public took care of 
the rest. “True, only Savarkar had been removed in handcuffs. But the rest had been shaped 
and directed by power of a softer kind, exercised in multiple and dispersed way, and only 
loosely co-ordinated, if at all, by the state,”48 wrote Nicholas Owen. While interdepartmental 
cooperation had set the tone for a more effective official global network, the newly hostile 
public opinion would continue to dictate the status of Indian students in England; this will be 
explored more deeply in the final chapter. 
As far as the general student population went, this kind of exceptional counter 
response was never necessary; however, its lessons about the effects of liberalism and 
imperial geography had broader implications. Even those who professed themselves 
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moderates following Dhingra’s murder were subject to increased scrutiny. They may have 
retained their social citizenship, but they had decisively lost the public’s benefit of the doubt. 
Dissent of even the smallest degree no longer enjoyed liberal tolerance in post-Wyllie 
Britain, as Britons now tended to lump nationalists of all stripes, Moderate or Extremist, into 
the same unwelcome category. London, initially a safe haven for anti-imperialist Indians, 
contained more traps than Savarkar and his followers had anticipated.  
This chapter speaks emphatically to the theme of colonial encounter that spans this 
thesis, even if it bubbled beneath the surface. The following chapter will examine London 
encounters from students’ perspectives in greater detail, but colonial interactions cut both 
directions. For students, London may have been the first site of encounter with ordinary 
British people; as will be discussed shortly, interactions in the metropole were largely free of 
the official repression that characterized interactions on the periphery. Similarly, these 
students were the first Indians that many Britons had ever met; encounters in the metropole 
offered colonial subjects a chance to prove they belonged but also to reinforce negative 
stereotypes. London was a social minefield for visiting students, upon which many tread 
unaware of its existence. Failure to conform to British norms was grounds for suspicion and 
ill treatment, especially in a world no longer inhabited by Sir William Curzon Wyllie. 
To say a few final words on Wyllie, history seems torn between irony and aptness to 
categorize his death. That a man who devoted his working life to Indian students – although 
whether for their benefit or repression is fair game for interpretation – had it ended by one 
such student is a finish to his arc that almost appears scripted. Among the hagiographers of 
India House, the writers who published semi-researched histories of the group and made 
legends of its leaders, the murder was an unsurpassably fitting end to a life that personified 
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imperial hubris and control. “Wyllie, eulogized by The Times as a lover of ‘justice and fair 
play,’ was not seen in the same light by the Indian students. They found his arrogant 
behaviour ‘obnoxious.’” wrote Rozina Visram decades later; even unbiased chroniclers 
understood the radicals’ disdain for the man.49 For historians without personal vendetta 
against a long-dead bureaucrat and an eye towards the longer term story of colonial students 
in Britain, the murder may also seem symbolic, if in a slightly less vindictive manner. 
Wyllie’s bloodied body underscored the impossibility of the empire’s goal of suppressing 
nationalism, but whether that task was fundamentally unattainable from the start or if it was 
only made so by the zeal of its opponents forms a historiographical debate that seems 
unresolvable between the two sides.  
In a sense, the myriad jingoistic obituaries and memorials that followed July 1, 1909 
were right: Wyllie was a martyr after all, though not for Britain or for the empire as they 
imagined it. Placing the blame for his death squarely on the India Office’s shoulders is an 
unfair and incomplete assessment. India House succeeded in rising to prominence because it 
put the imperial government’s policy in a position that it was never intended to navigate in 
the first place; with no recourse to tangible action before the assassination because of 
Britain’s liberal stance on the students, the India Office had no real choice but to continue its 
information collection tactics. If anything, it was this obsession with information that would 
eventually allow the India Office and its governmental cooperators to prove beyond a liberal 
shadow of a doubt that India House was an unacceptable element in British society. Perhaps 
liberalism required someone like Wyllie to die in the way that he did before a complete 
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unofficial severance of ties with the radicals made an official crackdown possible, his death 
unleashing the system that he had worked for decades to build.  
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IV - Different Shades of Nationalism: Student Perspectives 
Many famous names form part of this roll call of British-educated elite: Gandhi and Jinnah, both law 
students, Nehru, who spent seven years in Britain, first at Harrow, then at Cambridge and finally at 
the Inner Temple, and his daughter, Indira Gandhi, who was at Somerville College, Oxford.  There 
were hundreds of others, less well known. Some have left us records of their experiences, but the 
majority are merely names in the registers of their universities, or sometimes in official government 
records. 1 
– Rozina Visram, Asians in Britain 
 
For all of the attention paid by contemporaries and historians alike to the few radicals 
that left the most explosive impressions on the collective British mind, the history of Indian 
students is hardly comprised solely of the militants, the agitators, and the aspiring 
revolutionaries. Similarly, though even the years before Sir Curzon Wyllie’s assassination 
were peppered by anxieties about domestic terrorism stemming from Indian students, fears of 
overt violence form only a portion of the larger narrative of British attitudes towards this 
group of foreigners. Britons had been wary of India’s hopeful intellectuals since they first 
stepped off arriving ships in the nineteenth century for reasons ranging from a general unease 
with the presence of such potentially influential imperial subjects to more acute concerns 
about supposed Indian characteristics that clashed with British self-perceptions. 
 
Public Perceptions of Indian Students 
Though the radicals who comprised the history of India House were a tiny minority of 
the total population of students, they attracted an outsize share of attention and cast the mold 
against which the rest of the students would be judged. Despite a fairly uneventful history, 
the overall population of Indian students – even without the radicals – commanded plenty of 
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influence in England whether they wanted to or not, especially in the empire’s metropolitan 
heart. As Jonathan Schneer put it a century later,  
“India was the jewel in the crown of the British Empire, occupying 
a vital space in the imaginations of Londoners. Consequently India’s 
children in the capital city had a role to play disproportionate to their 
numbers. They were active not so much in local affairs as in helping to 
shape the emerging ambiguous and much-qualified discourse of anti-
imperialism.”2 
That is to say that the early Indian students – roughly those who arrived before 
1910 – were immensely significant for the ways in which Britons imagined their 
amorphous empire, not so much as result of anything that they did but rather by 
virtue of their presence. The British response – both public and official – to these 
generally unobtrusive students’ presence is telling about the larger imperial 
attitudes of Britons as well as how those attitudes were formed and how they could 
evolve; recall Nicholas Owen’s argument about the imperial soft power of private 
British intermediaries. Britons were fairly receptive judges, and their 
pronouncements on the acceptability of Indian students were in generally in 
response to students’ actions rather than exclusively defined by preconceived 
notions borne out of racism or xenophobia. 
 Far from existing in a vacuum, students who came to Britain from India were quickly 
subject to scrutiny from the Britons with whom they shared their lecture halls and city streets. 
Initially treated as objects of curiosity for fashionable English society,3 the increasing flow of 
students to Britain humanized them in the eyes of their peers, though not always positively. 
Testimony provided for an India Office committee in 1907 suggested that prejudice along 
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racial lines indeed existed between Britons and Indians, but that its roots were 
counterintuitively found in classism rather than racism. Per historian Sumita Mukherjee, 
“although racial prejudice existed, class prejudice was more noticeable in the universities 
against Indians who were deemed to have adopted the characteristics of the lower classes.”4 
Inherent biases against Indians students were therefore less important than how Indians 
behaved in relation to British social expectations. This fits tightly alongside the earlier 
argument drawn in the previous chapter from Nicholas Owen’s “The Soft Heart of Empire” 
that visiting foreigners in general – and students in particular – were afforded social 
citizenship until they proved themselves unworthy in British eyes. In as class-conscious of a 
society as Edwardian London, association with the working class of the city constituted 
acceptable grounds for revocation; this was a transgression stemming from ignorance rather 
than malice, but it was a mark against students regardless. 
 
 
The Slow Burn of Jagmanderlal Jaini 
 The biographies of the brightest-burning England-returned are numerous and 
thorough enough to render much exploration of them here redundant, but the majority of 
Indian students didn’t return from Britain on a Gandhi- or Nehru-esque trajectory towards 
revolution and immortality. For all their prestige and advantages, most of the returning 
students led fairly normal lives but carried interesting experiences from their time in Britain 
that reveal much about life in the imperial center and a unique qualification to tell their 
stories. Plenty of England-returned students penned memoirs later in their life about their 
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British reminiscences, almost all of which were written following independence and 
undoubtedly muddied by the passage of decades. More true to reality and more relevant to 
this work are the few student works that were written during their time abroad; though not 
much of these sort of literature has ever been unearthed – let alone published – a small few 
are available to modern readers.  
Perhaps the most interesting, relevant, and comprehensive account is that of 
Jagmanderlal Jaini, an Indian who lived in England for three years from 1906 to 1909. His 
journal was lightly edited and published posthumously in 1934, and though his entries are 
sporadic and often follow indiscernible tangents, it provides a fascinating character study of a 
student who seems fairly representative of his peers. A close reading of Fragments of an 
Indian Student’s Note-book is firstly an examination of Jaini himself, but it also works as a 
basic template for understanding the student experience. By no means was his stay in 
England the exact same as that of any other student, but it’s not difficult to see the same 
kinds of characteristics in Jaini what one might expect to see in any other apprehensive and 
overwhelmed foreigner in the empire’s center. His intelligence and introspection would have 
been common among his contemporaries, and his anger, confusion, and occasional inability 
to bear the weight of colonialism are the traits that make his candid memoir so striking as a 
piece of literature and so useful as a historical source.  
Aside from this published journal and a small treatise on the finer points of Jain 
philosophy that he authored later in his life, there is nothing about Jaini to be found in the 
historical record. No biographies exist and few scholars of Indian history even mention his 
account, let alone explore it, so fleshing out Jagmanderlal Jaini as a character independent of 
what he writes about himself is an impossible task, but perhaps that makes his journal all the 
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more appealing of a source. How readers interpret his writing and the ways that they envision 
him is itself an exploration of how these students interacted with the world and, indeed, a 
history beyond themselves. 
Jaini’s notebook begins in 1903 in Allahabad, India as an undergraduate at a 
university there. His earliest entries are a Western-influenced miasma of intellectualism, 
quoting Descartes, Benjamin Franklin, and secondary analyses of Shakespearean plays, and 
he seems acutely aware of India’s intellectual climate compared to that of Europe. At the 
behest of one of his college principals,  he has dinner with two newly returned students from 
England and is immediately awed by their Western mannerisms and conduct, sparking his 
own plans on traveling to Britain for further education. That evening, he wrote, 
…in fact the good impression that was given to my mind of the behavior and 
English of these two [England-returned teachers] leads me to think, that minus the 
many fools who go to England, mostly after having taken ‘French leave’ of their 
parents and others in India, hunt girls there, walk like so many big-grown children of 
a simpleton caste, and return as so many unhatched, or new-fledged Barristers to their 
mother country to bring shame to it, and to the undeniable better culture of the true 
Englishmen – that minus these, any intelligent India, preferably of a strong moral 
character, and with a frank and open, receptive mind, would be infinitely benefited by 
a residence in England.5 
 
 This is an important passage for beginning to understand the conflicting pressures 
facing Indian students like Jaini. The intangible aura of the England-returned captivated 
many on the subcontinent; British degrees in 1903 commanded an unmatched intellectual 
authority among Indians who were still just beginning to trickle into universities overseas. At 
the same time, there was a possible disconnect between English and Indian sensibilities that 
couldn’t be bridged simply by visiting the imperial center – one had to absorb the English 
manners that Jaini wrote constituted the “undeniably superior culture” of the English and 
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return an improved man rather than just a credentialled one. Jaini was by no means an Indian 
‘mimic man’ in search of imperial approval over all else, which makes his obsession with 
English culture all the more interesting.  
 While still an undergraduate, he wrote that, “The British, however well-meaning, just 
and humane their Government, are still foreigners. Their ultimate interests cannot be 
identical with ours...India is rising in agitation,”6 flashing early signs of his nationalist 
sentiment that would flare up later. When he debated traveling to England for study, it was a 
combination of England’s promise of self-satisfaction and India’s limitations that led him 
abroad: “Whatever you want to do or become, begin at once in practice persevere in your line 
of work with an honest zeal and with no regard for the praise or blame that others may feel 
inclined to visit your work with. For my present task I can take up two lines of work. In fact I 
have only two alternatives, going to England or staying in India. Taking the first, I must read 
law...I have to please my ideals, my truest self, and no one else.”7  
 For young Indians first stepping off steamships after weeks at sea, London was a 
shock to the system. It was the single most dominant city in the world, a bustling mass of 
humanity pulling the global strings of finance and culture. Jonathan Schneer wrote that at the 
turn of the nineteenth century, “London was the empire’s capital, and the imperial metropolis 
of the world…[the British] intended to instruct, perhaps even to rule, the world. And the 
British megalopolis, London, was their Rome.”8 According to the central thesis of his 
London 1900, the city was fundamentally imperial; both the Britons it molded into colonizers 
and the colonial subjects it attracted reinforced its cosmopolitanism and its seat of global 
power, producing a city defined by its superiority to the world beyond the River Thames.  
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 For the Britons of London, the city was a self-reinforcing testament to their divinely 
ordained empire; for visitors from that empire’s farthest reaches, it was an overwhelming 
experience and a constant reminder of their second-class status. “London is big and complex, 
and most visitors get lost in it, not only physically but also intellectually...I am sure that if I 
had to live continuously in London, I should be crushed”9 wrote a visiting student, reiterating 
the collective sentiment of countless students before him. “I leave the description of London, 
its streets, its buildings, its shops, and its multifarious inhabitants, representing almost all the 
different nationalities of the world, for the future...it was a new world to me, and I was 
bewildered in such a large city”10 reads the travel account of B.D. Basu, one of the first 
Indians to visit England as a sort of reporter and whose narrative was published in India to 
encourage further imperial movement. 
 Jagmanderlal Jaini split the three years he lived in Britain mainly between London 
and Oxford, and he enjoyed the liveliness of the former much more than the studiousness of 
the latter. Although constantly mindful against becoming one of the Indian students in “a 
London circle of youngsters, with whom, concentrated exertion is a sin, and solid-argued 
studied opinion an unwelcome stranger,”11 Jaini took in the sights and sounds of London like 
any other wide-eyed tourist.12 “The roar of this alien town – London – is in my ears. The 
spirit of poetry hovered about me...and drew me closer to the heart of humanity that flowed 
through the giant streets of this centre of the world”13 he wrote of the city, admiring its 
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peoples and its endlessness. Often overwhelmed by the vastness of the city that engulfed him, 
Jaini anchored himself in what nature the city had to offer. His journal is littered with 
descriptions of flowers, trees, and gardens that he encountered in England, and he seemingly 
made a point to write about the natural world as often as he did about the human one. This 
may have had something to do with his spirituality; in his introduction to the book, Jaini 
wrote that “Indeed there is nothing good or desirable in the world, which to some extent or 
other is not locked up in the arms of its contradictory…[the way to escape] is to recognize 
the reality of this den and of the flowerful glade of real roses outside. Till the rose glen is 
gained, the dark den must be tolerated.”14 Nature was an escape from the weight of the city 
and the weight of his identity for Jaini; acutely aware of his status as a colonial subject in the 
imperial capital, he used flowers and gardens as a reminder of what he was ultimately 
working for.  
 London was also the site of many young Indians’ first normal interactions with 
British people, differentiating the metropole from periphery in social as well as legal terms. 
“Most Indians had very little contact with British society in India. They were aware of the 
British presence in India and many had dealings with British Government officials, lawyers 
or teachers, but hardly socialized with them”15 wrote historian Sumita Mukherjee, creating a 
contrast with the openness of British society in London. While interactions with the 
aforementioned groups in India would have almost invariably constructed to reassert colonial 
hierarchies – whether of power or knowledge, but always with a Briton at the top – 
encounters in Britain would have been much less calculatedly repressive, instead offering 
Indians a chance to mingle freely with ordinary Britons outside the normal framework of 
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colonialism. Imperial tensions wracked the metropolis, yes, but Britons would have treated 
foreign students less as ‘conquered slaves’ and more as ‘fellow subjects.’16 While everyday 
interactions between Indians and Britons in India were almost nonexistent, Indian students in 
Britain were expected to participate fully in English life, whether by making English friends, 
attending theatre performances, or playing soccer and cricket with their British classmates. 
Shompa Lahiri quoted a pair of early Indian students’ thoughts on their national hosts: “The 
British people take a pride in being kind to strangers. The manner of an Englishman, 
however, undergo some change when he is outside his own country...he is proud and 
somewhat disdainful,” and another observed that “The very affable and obliging manners of 
the English ladies and gentlemen ‘at home’...are in full contrast to the blunt and cold manners 
they assume in India.”17 
 Moderate Indian nationalism’s central thesis was Dadabhai Naoroji’s pronouncement 
that British India was subject to un-British rule, and for newly arrived students it would have 
seemed that there was a cultural corollary as well. Compared to what they were experiencing 
in Britain, the conduct of Britons in India might have seemed very un-British as well. This 
was exactly what worried the India Office so deeply about the visiting students: in the 
unstructured, unguided British environment, these Indians would doubtless realize the 
discrepancies between the liberating social life of Britain and the repressive one of her Raj. 
Unassuming interactions between students and Britons were still colonial encounters, but in 
London they were nearly impossible to structure so as to constantly reinforce imperial 
hierarchies.18 The most basic fear of the India Office was that as a result of all these new, 
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uncontrolled colonial encounters, students would come to see themselves as equals to the 
British people that nominally ruled them. 
 This is not to imply that colonial encounters in Britain produced universally positive 
results for Indian students. As discussed earlier, ignorance of British etiquette was often 
reason enough for Britons to discriminate against Indians, as class prejudice begat racial 
prejudice. Just as interactions in India were meant to reinforce British superiority, 
interactions in which Indians in Britain acted – usually inadvertently – out of line with 
English customs could serve to reinforce Britons’ unconscious tropes of Indian inferiority. 
While ordinary encounters with British people in London could dispel students’ feelings of 
being second-class citizens, the same interactions had the potential to do just as much harm 
by justifying that same imperial hierarchy. 
 There are several key moments in Jagmanderlal Jaini’s narrative where his life 
intersects with a larger history, and though they can slide innocuously by in the course of a 
cursory reading, they are crucial to understanding both Jaini’s life abroad and the attitudes of 
his peers in England. In November, 1907, Jaini was invited to tea with a retired ICS officer 
working for the India Office whose name he omits but who seems to be acting in the same 
sort of semi-official manner as William Curzon Wyllie as a friendly emissary to students. 
“He invited us to tea to win us over to his Anglo-Indian views, or to try to damp our 
patriotism! The ball of Indian Nationalism seems to be impossible of being checked in its 
onward course of progress and freedom by these methods!”19 By late 1907, Jaini had become 
enamored of the nationalist cause; though he had always harbored some resentment towards 
the British Raj, it was during his stay in England that it fermented into bitterness and full-on 
revolutionary sentiment. The timing of the ICS officer’s visit was hardly coincidental; 
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historian Nicholas Owen marked the spring of 1907 as the starting point for “the new Indian 
nationalism” characterized by unabashedly seditious rhetoric and the unrelenting rejection of 
British cooperation in the immediate liberation of India.20 Embodied in the 1907 Surat Split 
between the Extremist and Moderate factions of the Indian National Congress, this was the 
strand of nationalism that produced the India House, and the British government was anxious 
to stamp out its sparks while they were in their infancy. Informal visits with Indian students 
were an often-utilized move by the India Office to keep tabs on possible troublemakers and 
to persuade them to ignore the fiery extremism that was proving more enticing to young 
Indians than the ineffective parliamentarianism of late nineteenth century nationalism.21  
 Though Jaini was studying for the Bar under the tutelage of an Oxford don, mentions 
of his studies after 1907 take a backseat to near-constant written attacks on British rule. “The 
reactionaries in the Government [of India] have called forth the Extremists in the people. The 
suspicious – unjustly, unwisely, suspicious – eye of the Government has infused the poison 
of suspicion into a section of the Indian people, and turned them into Extremists”22 read one 
accusatory entry, displaying a weariness of imperial surveillance and a latent paranoia born 
out of a disconnect between the governed and the governors. Jaini’s nationalism was on full 
display by the middle of 1908 in a handful of journal entries that deserve to be quoted 
verbatim for their anger and poignancy: 
 August 4: Affairs in India have taken a serious turn. Thousands of men have 
their minds full of ideas of Western political liberty and demands of rights based on 
these. It will be indeed a blessed day in India when the death-knell of despotism and 
autocracy is tolled in my Motherland!23 
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August 7: Patriotism is killed by being labelled sedition and treason and then 
hanged! Independence is stifled under the garb of insubordination! Truth is 
suppressed in politics, in public offices, and everywhere, and then the Indians are said 
not to love the Truth! Meanness and inhumanity could not go further.24 
 
August 24: India has lived and may live again; but now it is almost dead! 
England was not when that Aryan warrior killed the inoffensive deer with his exact 
arrow; England may not be in the future when India’s sons are honoured, where they 
are scantily honoured now.25 
 
September 30: In Indian Politics every Indian, Hindu or Mohammedan is a 
latent extremist. This is only natural, if by an extremist we mean an Indian 
Nationalist…Foreign control, foreign interference in the essential concerns of the 
Indian people is bound to be tolerated less and less every day, and it is useless to try 
to suppress it.26 
 
Though Jaini never mentioned interacting directly with any prominent members of the India 
House group or visiting the Highgate mansion, he was drawn independently towards the 
same nationalist conclusions and at least once was in the same room as some of them. On 
October 16th, 1908, he wrote of attending an extremist meeting at Caxton Hall where “there 
lay the pure Indian fire with its depth and with its intensity.”27 This assembly shows up 
elsewhere in the historical record: an India Office memo by William Curzon Wyllie entitled 
“Disloyal Behaviour of Indian Students at Caxton Hall” in which he wrote that “There can be 
no doubt that the feeling of disloyalty among the Indian Students is growing day by day, and 
the majority of the Students in London are neither afraid nor ashamed to openly manifest 
their disloyalty…I have no hesitation in saying that the root of the disaffection in India is to 
be found among the Indian Students in this country.”28 Though Jaini wasn’t affiliated with 
any particular extremist groups, he was still the type of student that the India Office was 
intent on monitoring; if Jaini was indeed emblematic of his Indian peers in England, it 
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quickly becomes apparent how daunting such a task would have been for the imperial 
government. 
 On the topic of Curzon Wyllie’s assassination a few months later, Jaini was less 
explicit. “An Indian student shot Sir Curzon-Wyllie at an ‘At Home’ in the Imperial Institute 
yesterday! How suggestive and how terrible. Nature is red-toothed”29 reads his entry from 
July 2nd, 1909, which ends coyly with “Is there anything nobler than Archimedes killed on 
his theorem?” Perhaps this was the latest iteration of Jaini’s convoluted views on imperialism 
and Britain; though he clearly detested British rule in India, he maintained a respect for 
Englishmen and their culture, and Wyllie’s death may have struck a macabre balance 
between the two. The assassination was a tipping point for how far Jaini was willing to go for 
the nationalist cause and set the stage for his climb down from the extremist zenith. A gentle 
man by any reading of his journal, bloodshed seems to have turned Jaini sour on the reckless 
approach of the London radicals and caused him to rethink his anti-British views. The about-
face may have also been motivated by concerns about his place in British society; as 
mentioned earlier, the Wyllie assassination created an environment in which vocally 
nationalist students were lambasted on official and unofficial fronts. Nirode Barooah’s 
previously mentioned Chatto detailed the levelling effect this had on the former India House 
members, and it’s reasonable to assume that Jaini – even as unconnected as he was from the 
group – would have been just as motivated to present himself as wholly cooperative with the 
British.30 
A few short months after the murder, Jaini was set to return to India; by having been 
called to the Bar and avoiding any tainting association with the India House, he was well-
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positioned to succeed back home. As his departure grew nearer, he reflected again on the 
complicated differences between the British and their empire: “The nearer I feel the time of 
my departure, the heavier grows the regret at the impending parting with England. In sun-
burnt, ‘conquered’ India, all that makes life living here is missing there. True independence 
with all its fullness...all these things, alas, will be left behind! An atmosphere of liberty and 
peace will be replaced by one of slavery and disquiet.”31 “The extremist propaganda is so 
gloriously patriotic and so irresistibly logical. The policy of the British is so stupidly short-
sighted, and drives us against our will, at least tends to drive us, to become extremists...But 
what about this sadness in me at the thought of leaving England? Shall I ever come back 
again to this London?”32 he mused in his last entry abroad.  
This final entry is open to a variety of readings, but it foremost serves as a reminder 
that the empire’s topography was multifaceted. Studying in Britain was a liberating 
experience for Indians both intellectually and socially; in India, the ideas didn’t flow as 
freely and the Britons weren’t as friendly. Many other students echoed Jaini’s conflicting 
desires of returning to their homeland but also of retaining the freedoms of England. Lahiri 
reprints the accounts of two women, one of whom returned to India and another who stayed 
in Cambridge: “‘We all want so much to return to England. We miss the free life we led 
there, here we can hardly go out to the limits of our garden” wrote one after a short period 
back on the subcontinent, while the woman who remained in England wrote “There is a 
popular saying that even a slave becomes free as soon as he steps on the soil of England. I 
myself can feel very well that there has been a significant change in my attitudes and values 
since I started to breathe in the open air of England and to live with the free people of that 
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country.”33 The contrasts between India and Britain were especially stark for them as women; 
Jaini wrote in his first journal entry while in England that “The range of information and the 
readiness with which they make use of it, is an admirable thing in the Western 
woman…Would the Indian women also were to have her emancipation likewise!”34  
The prestige of a British degree was often accompanied by a crushing social burden 
upon return to India. Sociologist A.K. Singh wrote that Western education, by “separating 
the Western-educated elite from the people of the country, made the modern Indian a 
‘marginal’ man, living between two cultures.”35 Though they enjoyed prominent positions 
within society and commanded high salaries, many were treated with scorn and resentment. 
[Their] entire society neither had opportunities nor inclination to educate itself 
with the new Western values. Their private life was divorced from their public life. 
Their intellectual life was dominated by Western ideas and values, but their social life 
was resigned to traditions and customs of the old society. They learned European 
theories and practices in the colleges, but put them away, with their European dress, 
when they crossed the threshold of their homes.36 
 
Western education is often credited with the emergence of a new Indian upper-middle class, 
but upward mobility often came at the cost of personal happiness and intellectual 
consonance.37 Though the England-returned were a critical force in creating discontent 
within India, not everyone was willing to listen to their ideas; the rejection that many 
students faced in India was often not quite so different from the tepid acceptance they had 
experienced in Britain. 
Jagmanderlal Jaini’s story is ultimately a sad one. Inspired to study in Britain by the 
pair of England-returned students he met years ago, his own return to India was far less 
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welcoming. Two years after leaving London, he lamented that “My life is a woe. Am not 
sure if I was right in being persuaded to come back to India...Painfully uncomfortable is the 
Indian soil38 under my feet. Camillus and Themistocles could not have found ungrateful 
Rome and Athens more teasing and expelling than I find India at the present time!”39 He 
found his job as a barrister miserable and had no friends, as most Indians mocked him as a 
‘Brown Englishman’ who had turned his back on India in search of Western approval. He 
ceased writing angry diatribes about imperialism, conceding that “By wild flaming and 
precipitate impulsiveness, based on the ugly and suicidal policy of hating the English, India 
can only hurt herself and delay her own discharge [from the empire].”40 He eventually moved 
back to London a few years after leaving, at which point his journal ends. Though he 
returned to India and spent the last part of his life as a judge in Indore, any further 
construction of Jaini’s life is impossible. The narrative his journal forms, however, is a 
unique piece of literature in what insights it provides into the student experience in England. 
Jaini was a young man acted upon by many conflicting pressures, and the themes that emerge 
from his story – the search for an education, a sense of meaning, and a home on the other 
side of the world – comprise an ultimately human account. 
 
M.P.T. Acharya: Powder Keg 
 “The ugly and suicidal policy of hating the English” that Jaini referred to was likely a 
retrospective jab at India House and provides a segue into a contrasting case study: M.P.T. 
                                                
38 The recurring allusions to the world underfoot in student accounts do a lot to further the sense of 
geography that permeates this thesis. Jaini’s “painfully uncomfortable” Indian soil contrasts sharply with Das’s 
(n. 34) liberating English soil and “open air,” lending an earthly physicality to the divide between Britain and 
India that was also social and racial.  
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Acharya. His autobiographical account of India House and beyond has been cited previously 
in this thesis, but it merits closer examination by illustrating several manifestations of India 
Office policy as well as offering an alternate path to nationalism from the philosophical one 
that Jaini followed. An active agent for Savarkar’s FIS and a star in the so-called “Gallant 
Galaxy” of Indian agitators abroad, London was the first in a series of Leftist stops across 
Europe for Acharya.41 His status as a student in England seems to have been more a façade of 
respectability than any real attempt at an education; if anything, he spent his time at the 
Highgate mansion learning the revolutionary techniques that he would take with him on 
socialist endeavours to Paris, Istanbul, Stockholm, and Moscow in later years. 
Shortly after his departure from England in 1909, Acharya authored an account of his 
time in London, providing a voice from inside the radical group at key moments during the 
India House saga and a counter-perspective against which to view India Office actions 
towards students. In 1991, Indian historian B.D. Yadav published Acharya’s narratives 
alongside a biographical sketch drawn from archives across several continents that served as 
context and extension of the original account; M.P.T. Acharya: Reminiscences of an Indian 
Revolutionary is an incredibly useful book for historians seeking to explain India House 
Yadav’s biography of the author is twice as long as Acharya’s actual text, and it’s 
interesting in its own right as a prime example of the hagiography that has sprung up around 
the heads of India House in the decades since its closing. Madan Lal Dhingra has become the 
subject of a biographical catalogue in his own right, as adoring Indian writers in the years 
since 1909 – and especially following India’s independence – have rehashed his story to the 
point of unrecognizability, enshrining Dhingra as a nationalist saint and an essential figure in 
early Indian nationalism. The works cited throughout this thesis – like those by Datta, 
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Waraich & Puri, Maighowalia, Sareen, and Srivastava – are more often than not they are 
little more than volumes of thinly-disguised hero-worship, occasionally useful for the barest 
facts of establishing India House’s history. Most writings in this genre aren’t wholly reliable 
as objective histories, placing an even greater importance on the primary writings of students 
themselves. 
As for Acharya, his text reveals a man crusading for Indian independence very 
differently than Jagmanderlal Jaini. For Jaini, Indian nationalism began as an amorphous 
dislike of foreign interference in Indian affairs and only took on a personal bent after his 
English experiences. Throughout his arc, Jaini remained pro-British, anti-imperialist, and 
maintained that Indian independence was a struggle unconnected to any larger, global 
history. In contrast, Acharya was more of an itinerant political troublemaker, living 
“anywhere I could live cheaply and also do some nationalist work.”42 Indian nationalism in 
Acharya’s writing was important but not all-consuming; he considered it more of a first step 
in a global Leftist revolution than the be-all, end-all it was in Jaini’s journal.       
The story of how Acharya ended up in London to begin with is example enough of 
Nicholas Owen’s convoluted geography of imperial freedom. Politically active from a young 
age, he was driven out of British India by charges of sedition stemming from political 
cartoons and articles in a periodical he co-authored. Even French Pondicherry wasn’t safe 
haven enough for Acharya to carry on in the subcontinent, and he left for Europe in 1905.43 
His flight from India was much like that of Krishnavarma’s from London in 1907, driven by 
the promise of safe haven beyond the reach of sedition charges. 
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Acharya came to the India House destitute but willing to play an active role in the 
group’s mission. Paul Schaffel observed that since Savarkar’s militancy alienated the 
students concerned about future career prospects, most of FIS’s actions were carried out by 
those who depended on the hostel for food and shelter; this description fits Acharya 
precisely.44 By the time Acharya arrived in Highgate, the hostel was on the decline; “It was 
like a lepers’ home...none but the most reckless Indian student would dare to visit the India 
House or have anything to do with the Indian fellow students there, for he may be disbarred 
from institutions on account of even his chance visits.”45 Such a description adds evidence 
against the traditional historiography of India House as a tightly-knit terrorist den; it was 
instead an underpopulated group on its last legs by the time that Dhingra shot Wyllie. In 
return for a place to live, Acharya became a primary fundraiser and organizer for the group, 
responsible more for the logistics of its plans than the ideas behind them. Savarkar was the 
brain of the FIS, and Acharya was one of the few limbs that would actually carry out his 
commands. This draws a foggy outline of Acharya’s nationalist picture: drawn towards 
extremism less by its tenets than by Savarkar’s allure and the FIS’s promise of excitement, he 
was more henchman than mastermind. Acharya was only nominally a student in London; he 
took photoengraving classes at a technical school to maintain his pretense of innocence, but 
the Free India Society was his primary concern. By several accounts, it was nearly Acharya’s 
finger that pulled the trigger on July 1, 1909 and his name that went down in infamy. 
Savarkar, ever on the watch for young Indians willing to follow through with acts of political 
violence, constantly pressured Acharya to martyr himself until the eve of Dhingra’s 
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shooting.46 In June 1909 he declared himself ready to avenge the atrocities in British India, 
and if not for Madan Lal Dhingra he very possibly would have been the one to gun down 
Wyllie days later.47  
Acharya’s revolutionary nature was perhaps less ideologically substantive than Jaini’s 
anti-imperialism, but it was the same brand that attracted Madan Lal Dhingra. Both were 
drawn to Savarkar’s magnetic personality and powers of oration more than they were 
attracted to nationalist ideas themselves. Acharya and Dhingra had both felt the empire’s 
repressiveness in India; Acharya had been chased out by sedition charges and Dhingra had 
experienced racial abuse while working on an P&O steamboat before coming to England.48 
Savarkar capitalized on personal grievances to enlist both of their help, perhaps reminding 
Dhingra of how his parents had asked the imperious William Curzon Wyllie to steer him 
straight, and Acharya of his childhood friend rotting in a jail cell on the Andaman Islands as 
a result of their seditious periodical. Their nationalism was an intensely personal one, 
partially manufactured by Savarkar but with its roots in colonial encounters gone wrong. In 
contrast, Jaini’s nationalism had begun as an impersonal distaste for an abstract empire and 
only acquired its hostility upon his realization of how affected by imperialism his freedoms 
actually were. 
 
Conclusion 
For a group whose manners, accents, and clothing were all so thoroughly scrutinized 
at the time, considering how Indian students reacted to British treatment – and how those 
reactions in turn shaped British attitudes – is a key element of the story of India House. Even 
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students unaffiliated with the hostel had a role in influencing what the public thought of its 
inhabitants. Colonial encounters in the metropole were liberating for students by virtue of 
their normalcy compared to interactions with Britons in India, but they carried the risk of 
unintentionally reinforcing stereotypes and hierarchies by neglecting to conform to British 
etiquette. The changing attitudes of the British public will be addressed in the final chapter, 
and understanding how Indian behavior affected those views is crucial to making sense of the 
turning tide. 
Jaini and Acharya seem to have shared little in common, but contrasting their 
experiences lends some insight into the roots of student dissent and the appeal of nationalism. 
In Britain’s intellectually liberating climate, realizing the scope and unfairness of the 
empire’s repression was often a staggering burden for students; an English education opened 
their eyes to Western freedoms but also to their own deprivations thereof. Whether in the 
form of ideas, employment, or surveillance, imperial topographies and unevenness served to 
embitter and disillusion students who experienced life on both sides of the empire. 
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V - The Three Bureaus of Information 
“I cannot help feeling a little worried about Indian Students in this country and Cromwell 
Road...”1 
– E.S. Montagu, Secretary of State for India, 1920 
 
 Millions of historically-minded visitors to London pass by it every year, but the 
unassuming building at the corner of Cromwell Road and Cromwell Place is hardly a sight 
that sticks in the minds of the city’s tourists. The Natural History Museum across the street 
captures most of their attention, and the French flag hung outside the cornerhouse that ripples 
lazily at the light touch of a cool August afternoon’s breeze registers as little more than a 
momentary break in the sea of Union Jacks that surrounds it. 21 Cromwell Road is still a 
bustling government hub these days as the location for France’s consulate in England; 
situated deep within the affluent borough of Kensington, it stands only about two blocks 
south of the site where Madan Lal Dhingra and Sir William Curzon Wyllie had their deadly 
encounter. A blue plaque on its eastern exterior wall marks it as the longtime residence of 
nineteenth-century architect and philanthropist Charles James Freake, but the building has a 
significance beyond this official designation of historical heritage. The four-story building 
that blends seamlessly into an imposing row of identical off-white facades that stretches 
down the street was once the seat of another government agency, a branch of the India Office 
that for a few short years occupied the premises during its last attempts to establish a measure 
of active control over Indian students. Within its walls were private offices, a government 
bureau, and twenty-five beds, forming a thoroughly strange imperial space situated 
somewhere within the dissolving boundary between metropole and periphery. The 
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significance of this space in the years between 1910 and 1912 has been lost on historians as 
completely as it is on the few passersby who glance momentarily at the unassuming, 
unrelated blue marker as they hurry along the sidewalk; this chapter is an attempt to bring 
some meaning to 21 Cromwell Road and the ghosts of its inhabitants. 
	 With the execution of Madan Lal Dhingra, the imprisonment of Vinayak Savarkar, 
and the dispersal of the remaining revolutionary students who had vocally supported its 
extremist cause to varying degrees, the India House had effectively been demolished by 
1910. The British public still regarded Indian students with a distrustful eye, but the absence 
of any similar groups or high-profile events did a great deal to calm official British anxieties 
about the students as a whole. This absence was less a conveniently unfilled void than an 
actively inhospitable England; the tolerant safe haven of years past had been replaced by a 
decidedly unwelcoming and discouraging environment. This chapter is in part an 
examination of the forces that ensured another India House never took hold, and it requires 
backtracking to a point where Sir William Curzon Wyllie – and not just his memory – was 
still an active figure in Indian student affairs. 
 As discussed in Chapter III, the latent danger posed by the India House didn’t go 
unnoticed by bureaucrats in the India Office. In 1907, two years before Wyllie’s 
assassination, the Secretary of State for India appointed Sir William Lee-Warner to head a 
commission to investigate the condition of Indian students living across Britain. Tasked with 
quantifying the student population, identifying their problems as well as the problems they 
seemed to attract, and to formulate some possible solutions, the three heads of the committee 
spent three months travelling the island visiting universities and interviewing students, 
faculty, and people with a special knowledge of the issue. Upon submission of their 
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subsequent report, its inflammatory language and provocative assessments of the problems 
raised concerns within the India Office about its power to galvanize educated Indians both in 
Britain and on the subcontinent. The report was left unpublished for over a decade, only 
appearing as an appendix to the report of a similarly tasked commission headed by Lord 
Lytton in 1922; the India Office, however, carried out most of its major recommendations. 
Though the commission itself was conducted in 1907, its most important effects wouldn’t be 
seen until after Curzon Wyllie’s death and should be considered a singularly important 
document in the history of India Office policy towards students, with its roots in the 
begrudging hands-off mentality before July 1909 and its more active effects in the years 
afterwards.  
In particular, one implemented recommendation from the committee’s report 
especially illuminates both the changing role and strategy of the India Office between 1907 
and the outbreak of the First World War: the Bureau of Information for Indian Students. 
Proposed as a paternalist arm of the India Office that would ensure students received accurate 
information about British education and were subtly imbued with pro-British sentiments, the 
Bureau’s function vacillated over the its four years of operation and its subsequent 
reconstitution in 1912. Rather than an agency with an unwavering mandate, the history of the 
Bureau of Information is composed of three discrete chapters that form a narrative arc of 
their own, as its functionality quickly reached a practical zenith after Wyllie’s assassination 
and then experienced a prolonged slide into ineffectiveness in the years after, due in part to 
the benevolent ideology of the man at its head2 as well as to its increasing irrelevance in both 
an empire now straddled by an integrated intelligence network and a London no longer 
favorably inclined toward Indian students. Paul Schaffel argued that the Bureau of 
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Information failed because of a linear shift in ideology from mistrust to benevolence, but this 
misses the underlying point: at its core, the Bureau was too reactive to succeed in a pre-
Dhingra London, too voluntary to gather any meaningful intelligence afterward, and too 
tangible to contribute effectively as a surveillance agency within the empire’s shadowy new 
global information order.  
It is this last point – the Bureau’s physicality – that signaled the end of the India 
Office’s own policy arc regarding information and Indian students. What was initially 
inspired by a nebulous and informal network in the Indian hinterlands had by 1912 become a 
single agency with a lone man in charge, located in a building in central London that 
advertised its presence to the very students it was intended to surveil. The India Office had 
systematized its own intelligence network and informally incorporated a handful of private 
English intermediaries with similar missions as part of its drive towards centralization. By 
creating its own constructed information order that was highly visible to all students but 
voluntary to engage with, it unavoidably exposed its own intentions and rendered itself 
fundamentally ineffective from the beginning. 
The history of the Bureau of Information draws on all of the major themes established 
earlier in this thesis: the restrictiveness of liberalism, manipulations of the information order, 
and the role of privately-held soft power in allocating social citizenship to colonial subjects 
in the metropole. Its story is the story of both Indian students and imperial attitudes toward 
them, told in miniature; the building that it occupied in South Kensington, simultaneously 
home to the Bureau’s offices and private English groups as well as a temporary hostel for 
students, was a microcosm of the imperial dynamics at play between the three parties 
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throughout their stormy decade-long interaction and a fitting conclusion to the India Office’s 
active attempts to control students. 
 
The Lee-Warner Committee and its Imagined Bureau 
 Alongside Lee-Warner on the 1907 committee were William Curzon Wyllie and 
Theodore Morison, the latter of whom would go on to chair his own commission in 1913 
regarding Indian students seeking industrial education and employment in Britain. Beginning 
in May 1907, the committee heard testimony in London before moving across the country to 
hold meetings at the universities in Oxford, Cambridge, and Edinburgh, interviewing ninety-
nine people across the span of their inquest.3 The committee was well-staffed – Lee-Warner 
and Curzon Wyllie shared a history of administrative service in India; Morison had spent 
nineteen years as a professor at a college in India and was regarded as an expert on Indian 
education reform4 – well-funded, and enjoyed a large pool of interviewees and documents 
with which to guide their work, and yet “the findings of the Lee-Warner Committee…were 
so embarrassing and likely to offend Indians that the publication of the report was prevented. 
In 1908, the Viceroy of India Lord Minto thought the publication ‘would no doubt put fat 
into the fire again.’”5 “Much bitter feeling would be aroused, resulting in angry discussion 
and agitation, which would discredit any arrangements which Government might make for 
protecting and helping Indian students in England, to such an extent that no student would 
take advantage of them…it would be nothing short of disastrous to publish the report”6 he 
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wrote in a telegram, fearing pushback against both the imperial government as a whole but 
also against the committee’s specific recommendations that, despite the inflammatory report, 
were generally considered sensible and fit for implementation. 
 The majority of the report is fairly inoffensive and dull reading. The committee 
presented the first official estimate of the Indian student population’s size – approximately 
seven hundred, with over half residing in London – and the bulk of the report’s first few 
chapters doesn’t amount to much beyond hazy depictions of the student experience in 
Britain. An early chapter reiterates public anxieties about Indian immorality and natural 
inclination toward vice, relaying a handful of vivid examples of young Indians who became  
absolute wrecks, the short story of whose life in England consists of 
running with unabated energy one uniform course of the coarsest and 
most vicious pleasures, procured by means that would disgrace the 
cruellest savage, by bullying and frightening an ignorant and indulgent 
parent out of his last penny on earth and then rewarding his kindness by 
breaking his heart and ultimately sending him to his untimely grave.7 
 
Such passages stand in stark contrast to the committee’s official verdict on these types of 
stories: “…although the number of wrecks is not unimportant they constitute the 
exception…the majority of Indian students get through their time in London without 
disastrous results,”8 setting the tone for a report chock full of backhanded compliments aimed 
at students. The imperial capital was home to the most worrying subset of the population. 
With its abundance of experiences unavailable in India and its myriad temptations, London 
could suck in any visiting student, whether an Indian from Bombay or a young Englishman 
from Birmingham. While students at Cambridge and Oxford fell under a great deal of 
university supervision, most students in London were studying for the Bar, a fairly self-
motivated course of work that necessitated little in the way of frequent contact with educators 
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who felt little need to intervene in students’ affairs unless they affected their academic 
standing.9 They by and large lived freely and away from official eyes, a troubling prospect 
for a government now keen on monitoring them closely.  
 Among the report’s stated consequences of the government’s inability to exercise an 
ideal amount of control over these semi-disappeared students was their increasing political 
radicalization, and it was the contents of the report’s fifth chapter – “Indian Students and 
Politics” – that drew most of the Viceroy, Lord Minto’s, justification for the report’s non-
publication. “We feel justified in asserting that a considerable proportion, probably a 
majority, of the Indian students who come to this country are imbued before leaving India 
with the political opinions of the advanced section of the Indian Opposition, and are 
animated by a feeling of discontent with British rule; and that these political opinions and 
this discontent are usually strengthened by their residence in England”10 the committee 
asserted, describing a “’blood and thunder’ type of Indian” dead set in his deep-seated and 
long-fermented hatred of everything British. For this, the committee assigned only a 
modicum of blame to the British government; rather than students’ experiences with 
imperialism in India or mistreatment during their stay in Britain, it was allegedly the 
prominence of party politics in Britain and the ‘discord within harmony’ model that confused 
students who – unable to distinguish party rhetoric from concrete promise – were swept up in 
a tide of what appeared to them as political conflict.11 Even then the committee placed hardly 
any blame upon Britain itself and rather determined that it was the – possibly unavoidable – 
naiveté born of an unfamiliarity of the workings of a democratic society that was causing the 
polarization among these foreigners, a paternalist pronouncement for the ages. 
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 Aside from the cursory pseudo-blame that the report allocated to British society, the 
majority of the problem resided with the “representatives of Extremists of Indian politics 
[who] spare no pains to win adherents to their cause among the Indian students as soon as the 
latter arrive in this country.”12 Clearly aware in 1907 of the existence and prominence of the 
India House and the widespread reach of the Indian Sociologist, the committee wrote with a 
pained tone that “while there is an active organization to create hostility against the British 
Government, there is no agency in existence in London which takes so much pains to get 
hold of Indian students or to counteract the effect of this political propaganda.”13 Torn 
between the British liberalism described in chapter III and the desire to quash the spread of 
extremism, the committee flirted in several places throughout the report with recommending 
a ban on any Indian students at all coming to Britain before settling back into a familiar 
impotence: “Grave, however, as we recognise the situation to be, we have no specific remedy 
to propose,” instead issuing a minor recommendation about raising the age required for 
Government scholarships on the basis that older students would find less of a tendency 
toward political volatility. Ultimately, the committee had tacitly admitted defeat in the face 
of Indian extremism at home by admitting the scope of the problem – “the men educated in 
England constitute an important section of the educated classes of Indian society, and their 
permanent alienation from the British Government would be a disaster” – while dithering 
powerlessly around a series of solutions it was too scared to officially recommend and 
ultimately concluding that the best course of action was essentially to hope that student 
hotheads would mellow out with the passage of time.14 Signed, Sir William Curzon Wyllie. 
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While the committee’s final report was quickly and unsurprisingly suppressed from 
public view, it did have some significant effects on India Office policy moving forward. Not 
all of its recommendations were of the ‘ban all Indian students’ variety, and most of what the 
report proposed was put into action within a couple years. Its three major proposals were all 
branches of the same general idea: subtly counteract anti-British influence by projecting 
goodwill in an official capacity. To achieve this, the report recommended the creation of both 
an Advisory Committee in London made up of Indians and Englishmen alike that students 
could contact with any needs or questions as well as the Bureau of Information for Indian 
Student that would serve as a liaison between British universities and students to ensure that 
prospective students were adequately equipped to apply for admission and well-prepared to 
adjust after enrolling. Additionally, it recommended that a pair of prominent private English 
clubs – the Northbrook Society and the National Indian Association – work together to focus 
their efforts and avoid redundant overlap. To further concentrate the coordination between all 
involved parties, the report proposed the purchase of a building that would house the Bureau 
of Information, provide an office space for the three private groups – though they would 
receive a significant government stipend – and serve additionally as a short-stay hostel for 
newly arrived Indian students in need of temporary lodgings and information about further 
adjusting.  
This plan eventually took form in the shape of 21 Cromwell Road, a standalone 
building in South Kensington across the street from the Natural History Museum and within 
minutes of the Imperial Institute. T.W. Arnold – the man appointed Educational Adviser to 
head the Bureau – had used the space as early as June 1909 as a venue for public receptions 
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in the ‘at home’ style for students.15 The India Office and the private societies settled on the 
building as their shared permanent space not long after. In part the location was reportedly 
chosen for its proximity to established Indian student neighborhoods; a Times article 
announcing the building’s leasing to the government claimed that “Many young Indians live 
in the Western suburbs, and the house is nearer their homes than Westminster, or than the 
eastern end of Piccadilly, where the Northbrook rooms have hitherto been situated.”16 In a 
strange quirk of London geography, the new location bore an eerie similarity to that of none 
other than the India House, the radical hostel at 65 Cromwell Avenue in Highgate; the two 
were separated by roughly seven miles and occupied entirely different streets that happened 
to share a name. Within its confines was the coexistence of Indian students, British 
government, and private English life; 21 Cromwell Road served as a unique physical space 
wherein three distinct spheres collided in an often uneasy balance of influence and 
independence. The three stages of the Bureau of Information’s history alluded to at the 
beginning of this chapter can each be characterized by the general conception of the Bureau 
in official circles at the time; this first stage was that of the ‘Imagined Bureau’ in which the 
new agency was a reactive body, a remedy for growing student unrest that functioned as a 
replication of existing hostile information structures. After Wyllie’s death, the Bureau would 
take on a more aggressive tone before finally lapsing into irrelevance after 1910. 
Though bureaucrats would have been loathe to admit it, 21 Cromwell Street was 
conceived of as a government-sanctioned India House. While the India Office’s efforts had 
previously hinged on simply collecting information about students, India House had 
demonstrated that putting information in their hands was a more effective tactic. Even though 
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Savarkar’s demands for active militancy eventually drove nationalist students away, they 
retained the leftist political views that the Free India Society had drilled into them, and that 
was perhaps more important than the few tangible actions that the group was able to carry 
out. The imperial government, clearly attuned to the value of information, had long 
recognized the importance that these England-returned students had on Indians upon their 
return, but had previously avoided official involvement for fear of stoking suspicion and 
instead left such responsibilities to private English clubs. In this light, perhaps the street 
address of the India Office’s 1908 physically-grounded attempt to establish a constructed 
information order wasn’t coincidental after all: a pro-British information hub on Cromwell 
Road to match the anti-British one on Cromwell Avenue. 
That the Bureau would dictate an artifical, constructed information order in reaction 
to India House was its imagined goal. In the subcontinental setting from which the India 
Office had drawn its inspiration for its intelligence strategy, the information order was an 
organic force; the ICS officers who used it to rule passively listened in on streams within the 
larger structure, rarely influencing it themselves. In contrast, the India Office’s newest efforts 
required them to create a new system of information flow – a constructed information order – 
that they not only had the ability to manipulate but that they had total control over. The shape 
of their constructed information order was expressly pro-British and flowed in two 
directions, both towards and away from students. Just as Savarkar could influence what 
information entered into, spread throughout, and left India House, so too was the India Office 
attempting to create a manipulable space where bureaucrats could ensure that anti-British 
ideas travelled in only one direction: from nationalist students to the surreptitiously 
surveillant government officials who could mark them for additional monitoring.  
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Information within the Bureau’s constructed order was designed to travel outward to 
students through several media. Most literally, it came published in a handbook. The 
National Indian Association had been putting out a series of handbooks for incoming 
students since 1893, offering information about Britain’s different universities and courses of 
study, as well as the processes of applying to them; they also emphasized seeking out the 
NIA’s help upon arrival in London for help in acclimating to English life.17 These 
guidebooks were widely read and had to be reprinted almost a dozen times by 1908, at which 
point the Bureau of Information co-opted the idea and published jointly-authored handbooks 
in the years after.18 While the handbooks explicitly offered to imbue students with a positive 
idea of English society, the Bureau’s other primary avenue of outward information flow – 
guardianship – was a subtler approach to the same destination.  
The idea of guardianship as a mode of controlling Indian students had long percolated 
throughout India Office thought. Groups like the NIA had previously offered to place 
students in surrogate English homes to keep them out of nationalist circles and expose them 
to a sunnier side of British life. The Bureau of Information offered the India Office an 
institution to systematically direct students towards private guardianship rather than simply 
hoping that students would voluntarily submit to private supervision; 21 Cromwell’s third 
and fourth floors would be dedicated to the Indian Students’ Hostel. Run directly under the 
Bureau’s auspices, the hostel’s twenty-five beds were temporary lodgings for freshly-arrived 
students where they could stay until they made long-term arrangements.19 T.W. Arnold kept 
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a list of government-approved private homes on file at the Bureau,20 and the obvious hope 
was that students would transition from the government hostel to an English home that could 
act as a government proxy. In effect, they would remain under surveillance – or at least the 
possibility of it – for the entire duration of their stay.  
Constrained by the familiar contours of liberalism, however, the converse inward 
information flow was largely impossible. Morley had forbidden the use of officially-
sanctioned spies within seditious circles and insisted that “the whole scheme is of a purely 
voluntary character.”21 Although several India Office bureaucrats made efforts to gather 
information about the group, their constructed information order fell short of its goal because 
of the glaring gaps in its knowledge about its radical opponents. Lee-Warner was acutely 
aware of this shortcoming and wrote that “[the Educational Adviser] cannot do this if, for 
fear of being called a ‘spy’, he keeps himself ignorant of...the black sheep. Notorious 
sedition-agents he should certainly know.”22 This was easier said than done; despite attempts 
to unofficially infiltrate India House, the India Office’s picture of the group remained 
incomplete and its constructed information order only succeeded in a distributory function.23 
Aside from its surveillance aims, a student hostel was hardly a new idea; it was only 
made possible in 1908 as public patience wore thin with India House. In 1903, the India 
Office had hosted a series of public gatherings at the Imperial Institute about the possibility 
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of opening a government-run hostel for Indian students.24 This was before Krishnavarma had 
established India House and was born more out of the type of amorphous public anxieties 
that had precipitated the certificate of identity scheme a few years prior. Still, opinion was 
divided on both official and unofficial fronts. A London correspondent for The Times of 
India reported a general distaste for the idea in July 1903: 
 …[T]here was a consensus of opinion against the provision of a hostel, and 
some division in reference to Sir William Lee-Warner’s suggestion for the 
establishment of a club. The dominant note of hostility to the plan of gathering Indian 
sojourners here under a single roof ran through the earlier speeches of [the previous 
meeting] and it was not until [today] that we heard a single word in favour of a 
hostel.25  
 
Lest he slip out of view for too long, Wyllie was an important voice in this early discussion. 
“The hostel was said to be Wyllie’s idea” claims Rozina Visram, citing his paranoia about 
students’ growing disloyalty; she argues that he proposed it out of a “need for an Indian 
hostel to ‘make them loyal’, in other words, under control and compliant.”26 Though history 
perhaps vindicates Wyllie’s worry, the 1903 public rejected the idea out of fear that it would 
stoke suspicion among Indians. This was a predictable outcome within the established 
framework of British liberalism: a public ill at ease with the presence of indefinably troubling 
foreigners yet iller at ease with the idea of limiting their freedoms. Since unofficial anxieties 
at this point were founded primarily on rumors and unrepresentative samples, Indian students 
were allowed to hold on to their social citizenship and avoid potentially restrictive oversight. 
Calls for a hostel reemerged several years later as India House was gaining notoriety, 
this time with more effect. A rash of newspaper editorials in British India supported 
expanding the cooperation between the India Office and private societies in response to 
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Highgate’s influence. “The proper means of counteracting the pernicious teaching...is to 
provide more wholesome centres for these students” wrote one op-ed, insisting that “it is 
time that the proposal for a hostel for Indian students was reconsidered in earnest.”27 Another 
complained that “A systematic campaign is waged with the view of poisoning these students 
the moment they arrive in Europe” and advocated government subsidies for private 
societies.28 A third questioned the useful of an expanded government presence in solving the 
larger issue of nationalist discontent: “A ‘Glorified Northbrook’ cannot, and will not, remove 
the cause of disaffection among the Indian students in England...none of [the private 
societies] offers any real facilities for the study of Anglo-Indian problems of the day. Is there 
any wonder that the poor Indian youth...falls back upon questionable sources of information 
for his political guidance?”29 As the shadow of Highgate stretched further across London, the 
British public was more willing to listen to ideas about restricting student freedoms, even at 
the cost of offending liberal sensitivities. Wyllie’s death opened the floodgates for more 
aggressive measures, and the Bureau of Information was one institution that benefitted from 
increased public acceptance after 1909. 
 
The Aggressive Bureau 
The Bureau’s first evolution, shifting from an ‘Imagined Bureau’ to an ‘Aggressive 
Bureau,’ came on the heels of Dhingra’s shooting and lasted until the end of 1910. Situated 
within the increasingly cohesive global intelligence network, the Bureau seemingly had the 
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potential to play a critical role and more aggressively expand its influence.30 Without the 
liberal benefit of the doubt protecting students, the attempt to enact a constructed information 
order within the confines of the Bureau that would feed into the larger network seemed a real 
possibility. That had been the goal for a while but was hampered by liberalism; without the 
public protecting students, the Bureau could both gather information more aggressively and 
put its files to use.  
The 1909-10 crackdown against India House was the first step in establishing a new 
global imperial intelligence network in which the Bureau of Information played a key role. 
Wyllie’s death was the impetus for increased communication and cooperation between the 
European agencies and the Criminal Intelligence Department in India; what began with John 
Wallinger’s transfer from Simla to London blossomed into the Indian Political Intelligence 
(IPI), a secretive new agency that integrated information inputs from India and Britain and 
coordinated with police agencies that could take action on it. The IPI has been mislabelled as 
the Indian Secret Service in earlier works; before its files were made public in 1998, even its 
name was a mystery.31 A short history of the organization authored upon its closure in 1946 
reveals that it worked in conjunction with Scotland Yard, MI6 and the India, Colonial, and 
Foreign Offices. It was created in direct response to Wyllie’s death:  
The wave of violent crime connected with the intensification of the Indian 
Nationalist Movement during Lord Minto’s Viceroyalty included the murder of 
[Wyllie]. This led to the deputation from the Central Intelligence Department  of the 
Government of India in the Home Department of an Indian Police Officer for 
attachment to the India Office. He was charged to co-operate with the Home Security 
organizations in detecting subversive activities among Indians here.32 
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The IPI’s mandate included gathering intelligence about security threats to British India 
across the empire as well as in Britain, including compiling dossiers about notable nationalist 
personalities and their activities. The Bureau of Information had plenty to offer within this 
cooperative  new system: during a 1911 review of the agency’s work, Educational Adviser 
T.W. Arnold reported that he kept a file on every student who visited, including 
correspondences between students and universities, a copy of his certificate of information, 
and his reported expenses.33 Arnold may have sold his own intelligence files short; a student 
who visited the Bureau found that the official he met with already had a thick file on him 
despite having never been to 21 Cromwell Road before. “Apparently my every movement 
had been recorded” he later wrote.34  Arnold acknowledged that in addition to the 
aforementioned official records he kept on each student, “I receive information about 
[radical] students from the Secretary of State’s department as well as from [presumably CID] 
officers in India; notes are also sometimes attached to certificates of identity.” These red 
flags were used to designate specific students for additional surveillance, Arnold continued: 
“In the case of such students...it has been found advantageous to place them in lodgings in a 
district not usually frequented by Indians, under conditions favourable to the formation of 
friendships with English persons.”35 This can easily be read as an attempt to transpose the 
structured colonial encounters in India into Britain; by isolating potential troublemakers from 
like-minded dissidents and putting them into exclusive contact with “good English life,”36 the 
Bureau intended to reinforce ideas of British cultural superiority while controlling the range 
of Indian interaction.  
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Arnold was not always met with as much warmth by Britain’s universities as the 
India Office would have hoped. Though he was able to set up contacts at every major 
university he needed for the Bureau to function effectively, Oxford perpetually proved 
unsupportive, if not entirely uncooperative. The university’s vice-chancellor saw the 
establishment of the Bureau of Information as an implicit encouragement for Indians wishing 
to study in Britain and rarely missed an opportunity to voice his disagreement with the idea. 
“How far it is good general policy, or for their advantage to encourage them to come to this 
country and to reside and study at Universities here rather than to provide them, if it can be 
done, with all they need in their country, is a wider question which I think ought to be 
seriously considered,” adding that Oxford University was, at least by his estimation, home to 
a disproportionately high number of Indian students already and that the last thing he needed 
was to sift through the unqualified applications of hundreds more each year.37  
Despite the university’s bluster, the India Office intended for the arrangement to work 
in favor of both parties and hinted at the Bureau’s primary objective immediately following 
Wyllie’s death. “By means of this agency it is hoped that the Education Adviser will be able 
to obtain all information regarding individual students which may be desired by the 
University and other authorities regarding individual students, and thus to meet what is 
understood to be a need which has made itself felt for detailed and trustworthy information as 
to the position, means, and character of Indian applicants”38 wrote one bureaucrat in July 
1909 to the contacts at Oxford and Cambridge in a particularly telling message about the 
disguised function of the Bureau of Information. While the new office publicly projected an 
image of benevolence and an outward flow of information to help students, the intelligence 
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continued to run the same direction it always had: from colonial periphery to imperial core, 
but this time within the confines of Britain itself. The information about these students was 
useful for the developing global surveillance network and also for university admissions; by 
effectively weeding out applicants deemed unsuitable by Bureau findings, it simplified the 
decision process for universities supposedly inundated by unqualified Indian applications. 
The Bureau’s function had thus already been altered in the short time since its 
opening: while it had been conceived of during a period in which students were afforded the 
liberal benefit of the doubt, Madan Lal Dhingra had opened up the possibility of the Bureau 
as an acceptable surveillance agency that could add consequence to its information. Spies and 
informants were increasingly in use by the time the Bureau moved from Whitehall to 
Cromwell Road, and the new Bureau opened a new avenue to intelligence gathering by 
providing a presumably safe space for new students that in turn capitalized on their resulting 
openness by surreptitiously gauging their compatibility with British society and identifying 
any potential troublemakers. This new approach was worked out during the weeks that 
followed the Curzon Wyllie assassination and doubtless reflected the newly validated 
paranoia that had until recently been little more than unsubstantiated anxiety.39 While the 
CID and Scotland Yard were taking direct action against India House itself, India Office 
bureaucrats did their part to prevent any future recurrences in the way that they were most 
familiar with: harnessing the information order. This slightly more sinister function of the 
Bureau of Information, obviously never publicly acknowledged in any official releases about 
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the new India Office branch, secretly defined the office’s role for the few years of its 
existence and is a lens through which the Bureau needs to be viewed. It was a unique arm of 
the growing global intelligence network, feeding information about potential troublemakers 
to the IPI. While attempts to construct an artificial information order before July 1909 had 
been thoroughly underwhelming, its shifting role within the new network lent it a tone of 
aggression; its connection with the IPI gave it teeth to back up the information it gathered 
and the means to collect even more valuable intelligence. It was an important and useful 
element of imperial surveillance for a little over a year following Wyllie’s death, but that role 
shrunk rapidly after 1910; it had been instrumental in helping the IPI get off the ground but 
had less of a part to play once it had become an established organization. 
 
The Irrelevant Bureau 
By 1911, 21 Cromwell Road was home to an Irrelevant Bureau; by the end of 1912, 
the Bureau had quietly been scrapped altogether. Part of the office’s rapid fall from grace 
was the divergent ideology of its head, and part of it was due to a shrinking niche within the 
empire’s global intelligence network. During the immediate aftermath of Wyllie’s death and 
the coordinated official crackdown on India House, T.W. Arnold had acted as a facilitator of 
information from student to government, passing along intelligence to authorities who could 
carry out actions on its recommendation. Arnold complied with government directives to 
make this kind of surveillance work possible, but he may not have been entirely comfortable 
with it; by 1911, less was being asked of him on that front and he used the lull to steer the 
Bureau back toward liberal shores. 
 With the CID and Scotland Yard coordinating efforts within the newly established 
IPI, the Bureau of Information wasn’t especially useful by the end of 1910. Savarkar had 
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been arrested and extradited to India, the Highgate mansion had been resold, and the few 
remaining outspoken radicals had left England for either the United States or the European 
continent. The vitriol and pushback – both official and unofficial – following Dhingra’s 
shooting had temporarily scared potentially dissenting Indian students straight, and no new 
nationalist organizations were springing up in London. The explanation for this was twofold: 
global intelligence communication allowed the imperial government to more closely monitor 
the movements of troublemakers and apprehend them before they could do damage, and 
public opinion in Britain no longer extended the liberal benefit of the doubt for students. 
Though not entirely unwelcome in Britain, students no longer enjoyed the uneasy tolerance 
that had allowed India House to take root. As such, there simply wasn’t much intelligence to 
be gained from students in London; those who knew anything about revolutionaries kept 
quiet, but most of them actively tried to distance themselves from those anti-imperialists.  
 No longer pressured to spy on trusting students, Arnold had free reign to remodel The 
Bureau in his own image and settled on one of well-intentioned paternalism.40 “His efforts as 
Educational Adviser to promote students’ interests were genuine” wrote historian Katherine 
Watt, and Arnold gradually renounced his role as an intelligence agent and returned to the 
style he was most familiar and comfortable with: the teacher.41 The Lee-Warner Report had 
recommended the Bureau be governed jointly by an Educational Adviser and an advisory 
committee; while Arnold took his position seriously, the same could hardly be said of the 
committee members. They met only a few times in the Bureau’s history and by 1910 Arnold 
was effectively running the Bureau by himself.42 He used this new power to work for 
students rather than against them, advocating on their behalf to officials at Oxford and 
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Cambridge and in doing so uprooting the Bureau’s earlier efforts to gain the universities’ 
favor with information. Watt writes that “His attitude towards students, whom he saw as ‘his 
babes’, was sincerely sympathetic to their ambitions and the prejudice they faced,” arguing 
that Arnold had been against student surveillance all along and had complied with India 
Office orders to do so only as long as he was asked.43 He had occasionally complained about 
what was required of him, but still passed along information that was used to monitor 
suspicious students. Thus, the Bureau didn’t become irrelevant because Arnold decided to 
operate in opposition to India Office directives as Schaffel argues, but rather changed course 
after it had already been rendered obsolete by the more effective methods of the IPI. Arnold’s 
actions were a response to a decreasing role in the global intelligence network rather than its 
cause. 
A subtle yet notable feature of the ‘Irrelevant Bureau’ was its harmful co-optation of 
the two private societies. The Lee-Warner Committee’s recommendation had included the 
National Indian Association and the Northbrook Club (rebranded afterward as the 
Northbrook Society) adopting office spaces within the confines of the new building, a 
prospect that not everyone in the groups found ideal. In particular, a representative of the 
Northbrook Society wrote in 1908 to the India Office that the club was concerned about a 
loss of autonomy but that its members on the whole “are not averse from a scheme by which 
the overlapping and duplication of work would be avoided, while each society retained a 
separate and distinct existence.”44 The societies’ reservations aren’t difficult to imagine: 
much as the India Office was moving to focus and streamline its process for dealing with 
Indian students in an effort to better keep them under supervision, so too might the office be 
                                                
43 Watt, “T.W. Arnold and the Re-Evaluation of Islam,” 79. 
44	OIOC IOR/L/PJ/6/845 file 233 “Bureau of Information.” 
115 
 
making an attempt to exercise some influence over the groups doing similar work and ensure 
a uniform approach to the problem. Per the committee’s recommendations, the India Office 
would pay half of the organizations’ rents for their spaces in 21 Cromwell Road and provide 
additional subsidies as necessary; coupled with the centralized office spaces, it would have 
been reasonable for the pair of private societies to stay fairly wary of the potential for the 
government to extend its influence over their own missions. 
By subsidizing the private groups and housing them under the same roof as the 
Bureau of Information, the India Office had however unwittingly cost them their legitimacy 
as private intermediaries in the minds of students. Having been lumped in with the 
increasingly repressive imperial government, they ceased to function as the well-meaning 
alternatives to official agencies they had been prior to 1910 and became one and the same 
with the India Office. Indians looking for friendly Englishmen to advocate on their behalf in 
a London where private support for students was dwindling no longer considered the 
Northbrook Society and the National Indian Association viable options; their legitimacy had 
been compromised by the government’s tainting touch and no longer wielded the same 
power to confer social citizenship upon visiting students. “[A representative] of the National 
Indian Association was aware that students she befriended were regarded as spies. Two 
representatives at Cromwell Road believed it was the government connection that was at the 
root of the problem”45 wrote Shompa Lahiri, providing evidence that the organizations’ 
leadership was aware of the government’s harmful influence. The new location also had 
practical drawbacks for the organizations; even with India Office subsidies, rent in 
Kensington was astronomical, and an inability to keep up with the required payments – due 
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in part, no doubt, to a decreasing membership within student circles because of their new 
suspicion –  was one of the factors in the NIA’s decline by 1920.46 
 
Conclusion 
In looking at the history of Indian students after 1909, public opinion was a force 
perhaps even more powerful than the government in dictating the status of Indian students. 
After 1909, Indian students were increasingly subject to racial prejudice and their presence in 
universities was increasingly met with British resentment, largely on the grounds that they 
were stealing seats from better-qualified English students. This is at least partially explained 
by the collective partial revocation of their social citizenship – India House had cost them the 
liberal benefit of the doubt. During a 1911 India Office investigation into the Bureau’s 
effectiveness, a student spoke on the recent uptick in unofficial prejudice. He claimed that ten 
years earlier, racism had been nearly nonexistent in the student experience, but in 1911 “The 
financial difficulties of some, the extreme political views of others, the commencement of 
anarchic crime in India and England, the hostility towards students of a certain section of the 
Press in both countries have contributed to the same result,”47 namely, a growing alienation 
among Indians in Britain. His testimony touched on the newfound hostility of several private 
British intermediaries: the press, his university classmates, and even his teachers had all been 
defenders of Indian students’ social citizenship before the Wyllie shooting, but afterwards 
had become decidedly less welcoming. 
This wholly moderate climate that emerged in 1909 doesn’t mean that English 
education didn’t produce nationalists as it had earlier; rather, it produced more nationalists of 
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the Jagmanderlal Jaini variety and fewer like Acharya. The Jainis of the student body 
followed in the moderate nationalism that Naoroji had pioneered while its Acharyas had run 
out of liberal goodwill in England. This is an explanation that works in harmony with the role 
of global intelligence in ensuring that no future India Houses ever took hold in England: both 
the public and the government held power over students in London, and neither party was 
willing to afford them as much tolerance as India House had received. 
21 Cromwell Road in itself was the physical manifestation that signalled the tail end 
of the transformative arc of the India Office’s use of the information order. What had begun 
in India as a nebulous network of native informants and tenuous chains had become a single 
building with a single man at its center; incorporating the private groups effectively signalled 
their end as alternative avenues and centralized the controlling influence over students in a 
single location. Common sense would support the India Office’s approach: an increasingly 
systematized and structured network intuitively lends itself to more effectiveness. The 
mistake was in believing that information could flow both directions through a single hub; in 
the minds of students, the information that the Bureau was meant to spread hardly justified 
interacting with what was obviously an institution designed to keep a close watch on them, 
especially when things like the handbooks made visiting the Bureau unnecessary. The 
Bureau may have had an element of well-intentioned paternalism that T.W. Arnold brought 
out during his tenure, but it was fundamentally an attempt to collect intelligence that 
pretended unconvincingly not to be. 
The Bureau of Information for Indian Students was the India Office’s final attempt to 
actively intervene in the lives of India’s cosmopolitan intellectuals. When the Lee-Warner 
Committee’s Report was finally published, it was as an appendix to a similar report 
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conducted in 1921 under the chairmanship of Lord Lytton, the son of the former Viceroy 
Lytton. That the investigation was conducted by the son of a past Governor-General seems 
apropos, as the tone of its report was a marked change from that of Lee-Warner’s in 1907 
befitting a generational shift in approach. Rather than recommending thinly-veiled 
surveillance measures, Lytton’s report keyed on the importance of developing India’s own 
education system. A thoroughly liberal solution that cast an eye towards preparing India for 
its increasingly inevitable independence, the committee’s report represented the end of the 
imperial government’s efforts to control students in Britain. The India Office maintained a 
presence in 21 Cromwell Road’s successor – a hostel sponsored by the Y.M.C.A. that opened 
in 1920 and still operates today – but never made any pretense to running its operation.  
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Conclusion 
“I have exceedingly great affection for the India Office and I am as pained to witness its 
passing as I am to see the partition of the Punjab.” 
 
 –Unsigned memo from an India Office bureaucrat, dated July 30, 1947. 
 
 To end this thesis where it began, recall The India Office’s pronouncement that 
“Empires thrive on bureaucracy.”238 In most cases, this is probably a fair assessment: on the 
colonial periphery in India, bureaucracy and systemization were crucial, if not entirely all-
encompassing, elements of effective imperial governance. In India, colonial encounters could 
be fairly well constructed and regulated by official authority, but in the metropole no such 
possibility existed. For transplanted colonial subjects, interactions with Britons and 
interactions with the imperial government were no longer one and the same; the influence of 
private British actors – and Britain itself – was stronger than that of the India Office. 
Similarly, exposure to anti-British ideas that were easily suppressible in Asia was 
commonplace in London. Aware that these uncontrolled encounters with British life and its 
detractors had stoked the embers of nationalism among visiting Indian students but limited 
by liberalism in what action it could take, the imperial government attempted to regain a 
degree of control by constructing encounters that would produce pro-British sentiments 
instead. The empire’s bureaucrats found Indians in London less controllable than Indians in 
the subcontinent, but their constant attempts to influence them regardless revealed a set of 
deeply-entrenched attitudes about Indian character and imperial hierarchies, even within 
Britain’s nominally liberal empire.  
 
                                                
238 Robin B. Winks, “Foreword” from The India Office, 1880-1910, Arnold P. Kaminsky, xi. 
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Watchful Eyes and Blind Spots Redux 
 
 Though the modes of surveillance shifted dramatically in the span of a couple 
decades from the amorphous networks in India to the concrete Bureau of Information in 
London, there remained a set of characteristics common to both. Both the ICS officers in 
India and the India Office bureaucrats in Britain believed information gathering to be their 
most useful tactic in clamping down on subaltern dissent, and both were plagued by 
information panics when their intelligence supplies ran dry. Britons in the metropole and 
periphery both engaged with the local information orders as a means of gaining some control 
over Indians. 
The different locations bred different solutions and approaches. In India, information 
panics led to an expansion of the existing intelligence network and a shoring-up of the 
existing bonds between nodes; in London, the creation of the Bureau of Information was an 
attempt to streamline and centralize rather than branch out. District officers on the 
subcontinent passively tapped into existing channels of Indian communication in their efforts 
to monitor troublemakers; London bureaucrats created forms for travelling students and 
actively encouraged them to seek out British influences during their stay in the imperial 
center. The India Office spent over a decade looking for a way to keep watch over students in 
London that would both work as well as methods in India but also adhere to the contours of 
liberal British society. It was a balance the India Office never completely struck, constantly 
shifting its tactics in response to changing dangers and the public’s assessment thereof. 
Though the India Office was fairly powerless in matters of surveillance for the 
duration of most of its efforts, the British public played a role in unofficial surveillance that 
was unique to the metropolitan setting. Private intermediaries – landlords, teachers, 
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newspaper editors, and others of the ilk – constantly trained a wary set of eyes on the visitors 
and exercised a peculiar influence that the government never could. The India Office 
constantly found its hands tied by the counters of liberalism, but those same restrictions on 
governmental action were conversely privileges for private society, and individual Britons in 
the metropole could make life difficult for colonial subjects if these intermediaries thought 
the visitors had overstepped their boundaries. 
Thus, while surveillance in terms of official intelligence was an apparent failure in 
Britain, the subtle cooperation of the government with the public actually had a greater effect 
than the outright governmental repression in India. The subcontinent was too vast and too 
diverse for the small number of imperial governors to ever come close to getting a 
stranglehold on, and revolutionary plots were a common feature of British India until 
independence in 1947. There were almost no comparable private intermediaries in British 
India to pick up the slack where the government was unable to, and the result was a colony 
that could never be completely controlled. In contrast, after Sir William Curzon Wyllie’s 
death in 1909, Britain no longer played host to any of the radicals that had previously 
enjoyed its protection, and no groups sprung up in India House’s wake. This wasn’t a lucky 
accident for the rest of the mid-level bureaucrats of the India Office; rather, it was the 
combination of government scrutiny with public intolerance. Governmental intelligence in 
London may have been less effective than its subcontinental counterpart, but the larger 
liberal machinery of the imperial capital ultimately proved more stifling than the thoroughly 
repressive Raj. 
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Colonial (Mis)Encounters 
 
This hostile Britain that emerged after Dhingra’s shooting was the nadir of Anglo-
Indian relations in the metropole and represented far deeper British attitudes than the reaction 
to a single murder. The presence of Indian students in London provided the context for a new 
type of colonial encounter, one that had the potential for both liberating and repressive 
effects. The Britons who populated British India were there for almost exclusively imperial 
ends; the British people that Indians would have encountered in the subcontinent were 
usually government officers, lawyers, teachers, or occupied other positions of power over 
natives. In contrast, the Britons that Indians interacted with in Britain were normal people, 
nominally their equals. This seemingly provided an opportunity for upending the imperial 
hierarchy: if British and Indian people were equals in London, what changed when the same 
interaction was transposed onto Calcutta or Delhi? This was the root of the India Office’s 
concern about visiting students, but – like it had with surveillance and monitoring – the 
British public subtly preserved the template of colonial encounter. The social citizenship 
described in chapter iii allowed Indians to feel free in Britain, but the fact that this freedom 
was a privilege granted by Britons rather than an inherent right reinforced the same imperial 
hierarchy at work in India. 
 While the numbers of students never flagged in response to decreasing British 
acceptance after 1909, the hostile public catalyzed insularity among them. Within an 
increasingly large population, Indian students generally made fewer attempts to blend in with 
British society or befriend British peers, choosing instead to associate more exclusively with 
other Indians. Sumita Mukherjee has argued that this insularity led to an inflated estimation 
of their own self-reliance from Britain that upon their return to India translated into stronger 
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calls for independence. In an ironic twist, students after 1920 controlled their own imperial 
encounters in London much as the British had controlled colonial encounters in India. 
 
 
 
Lessons from a Surveillance State 
 
 Extrapolating from history is a tricky business. The India Office itself learned this the 
hard way when it first began to develop its intelligence systems to monitor students in 
Britain: what worked well in one context was far from guaranteed to work in another. 
Attempting to map historical lessons onto the present is a similar minefield of qualifications 
and uncertainties, but this particular history has the potential to lend itself to an 
understanding of the world today. For an age when no mainstream news cycle seems 
complete without some frightening rumor of terrorist sleeper cells nestled inside Europe, of 
Britons returning from ‘jihadi’ training camps in the Levant, or of the National Security 
Agency’s apparent attempts to monitor every facet of Americans’ lives, the story told in this 
thesis is perhaps a relevant one. Through constant surveillance and mistrust, agents of 
imperial Britain – mustachioed bureaucrats and ordinary Londoners alike – created and 
exacerbated the very dangers they sought to avoid. The usual tempers of projecting history 
apply here, and the narrative of India House doesn’t map perfectly onto present conditions, 
but the implications are clear. Whether the world has learned from its past is another matter 
entirely. 
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